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Executive summary 
The Belgian federal government introduced several tax incentives in support of business research and 
development (R&D), in fulfilment of its commitment to raise investment in R&D to 3% of GDP. Between 
2005 and 2007 four schemes were presented that grant firms partial exemption from payment of the 
withholding tax on the wages of R&D employees. In addition, as of 2007 firms can choose between a 
tax deduction and a tax credit for R&D investment and in 2008 a tax deduction of 80% of patent income 
was initiated.     
Although still only a minority of R&D active firms in Belgium make use of the tax incentives, the num-
ber of beneficiaries increased gradually over the years, especially for the partial exemption from pay-
ment of the withholding tax on the wages of R&D employees with a master’s degree, which in 2015 was 
used by 1,670 firms. Due to the growing popularity of the tax incentives and three successive increases 
in the rate of the partial exemption from the withholding tax, the budgetary cost has increased substan-
tially. Whereas in 2006 government support through R&D tax incentives amounted to 0.03% of GDP, in 
2015 it reached 0.33%. As a result, by 2015 Belgium had become the OECD country with the most gen-
erous R&D tax incentives relative to GDP. 
Coincidentally, R&D expenditures relative to GDP, having declined considerably in Belgium between 
2001 and 2005, increased from 1.81% in 2006 to 2.47% in 2015. The correlation between government 
support and R&D expenditures is positive across OECD countries. However, recently the European 
Commission among others started to wonder whether some countries may have moved beyond the 
optimal level of public support to business R&D.       
This paper presents the results of the third evaluation of the R&D tax incentives that were introduced 
in Belgium between 2005 and 2008. The first evaluation covered the period 2001-2009 and only consid-
ered the four schemes of partial exemption from payment of the withholding tax on the wages of R&D 
employees. The second evaluation, covering the period 2003-2011, included an assessment of the tax 
credit for R&D investment and the tax deduction of 80% of patent income. The evaluation presented in 
this paper covers the period 2003-2015.  
As the tax incentives aim at raising the R&D expenditures of firms, the main research question of the 
assessment concerns input additionality, the extent to which public support succeeds in stimulating 
additional R&D activities. The fact that firms autonomously decide whether to apply for subsidies or 
tax benefits and how much they will invest in R&D activities complicates the estimation of the causal 
impact of public support. In the absence of experiments in which public support is randomly attributed 
to firms, estimation of its impact needs to be based on observational data, with a prerequisite to account 
for the autonomous decisions of firms to establish ‘causal’ effects. Unfortunately, all existing estimation 
techniques have limitations, and none can be considered superior. As in the previous evaluations, this 
paper therefore presents the results of different estimation procedures and emphasizes conclusions that 
appear to be robust across estimates.            
The evaluation takes advantage of the detailed information contained in the Belgian R&D Policy Mix 
database, which matches several sources. It contains information on support received by firms through 
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the different tax incentives as well as through subsidies for R&D and innovation that are provided by 
regional agencies. The data on public support are matched with information on firm-level R&D activi-
ties from the biennial R&D surveys, information from the annual accounts of firms and data on the 
number of patents granted in Belgium. The database is rather unique in that it provides firm-level in-
formation on the amount of support received through subsidies and each tax incentive. As such the data 
enable the estimation of the  efficiency of public support by linking the amount of support to the level 
of R&D expenditures at the firm level without the constraint of binary variables for support (firm re-
ceives support or not) as appears to be the case in most other countries. Moreover, as the amount of 
support is provided for each support scheme, the impact of each individual incentive can be estimated, 
controlling for the support provided through other relevant incentives. The complementarity, or lack 
thereof, between different support schemes can also be assessed.  
The results presented in this paper are for the most part in line with the findings of the previous evalu-
ations although more robust indications are provided for some partial exemption schemes. As in the 
previous evaluation, there are very robust indications of input additionality for the partial exemption 
from payment of the withholding tax on the wages of R&D employees with a master’s degree. However, 
contrary to the previous evaluation indications of the efficiency of the partial exemption from payment 
of the withholding tax on the wages of R&D employees involved in research cooperation are now also 
found to be very robust. The partial exemption from payment of the withholding tax for Young Inno-
vative Companies, for which little evidence of additionality was found in the previous evaluation is 
now, probably due to the larger number of observations, found to have robust positive estimates. There 
are also more robust indications of additionality for the partial exemption from payment of the with-
holding tax for R&D employees with a PhD or civil engineering degree.  
As the rate of exemption is the same for PhDs or civil engineers and masters, and PhDs and civil engi-
neers, by definition, have a master’s degree, the usefulness of the distinction between the two partial 
exemption schemes based on the educational degree of R&D employees is not clear. Since 2018 firms 
can also benefit from a partial exemption for R&D employees with a bachelor’s degree in qualifying 
study fields. This support scheme was introduced too recently to be included in this evaluation.    
Whereas the third evaluation clearly provides robust evidence that the four schemes of partial exemp-
tion from payment of the withholding tax succeed in raising additional R&D, as in the previous evalu-
ation it fails to find robust indications of  efficiency for the R&D tax credit and the tax deduction for 80% 
of patent income. For both tax incentives, only one of the estimates is positive in a statistically significant 
way and even than additionality is limited.  
This evaluation confirms the findings from previous evaluations that input additionality decreases if 
firms combine different support schemes. 
The budgetary cost of the R&D tax incentives in Belgium has increased considerably without much 
indication of a slowdown in the rise of government support through R&D tax incentives as a percentage 
of GDP. The fact that the bulk of the budgetary cost is due to two tax incentives for which evaluations 
provide few indications of  efficiency, suggests that there is some leeway in constraining the increase in 
the budgetary cost in a way that does not stifle the potential of tax incentives to raise additional R&D 
activities.  
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In 2016 the tax deduction for patent income was replaced by a tax deduction for innovation income. The 
rate of deduction was raised from 80% to 85% but in line with the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) guidelines of the OECD, some features reduce the generosity of the deduction. As the R&D Pol-
icy Mix data so far cover the period 2003-2015, the new tax deduction for innovation could not be as-
sessed. The most obvious support scheme to consider for adjustment therefore seems the R&D tax 
credit. A limit to the total amount of support or a lower rate of deduction above a certain ceiling could 
be envisaged, as is the case in many other countries. The indications of decreasing efficiency for firms 
that combine different support schemes calls for coordination and reflection as to limits to the overall 
amount of public support received by firms.   
The Belgian federal government reached an agreement on the reform of corporate income taxation in 
2017. One of the main features is the reduction of the basic corporate income tax rate. By 2020 the rate 
will be reduced from 33.99%, which was applicable up to 2018, to 25% for large companies. For SMEs a 
rate of 20% will apply up to 100,000 euro in profits and 25% above that level. As a result of the reduced 
corporate income tax rate, the budgetary cost of R&D tax incentives based on corporate income taxation 
will be lower, for a given level of R&D investment or innovation income, than now. Somewhat ironi-
cally, the differentiation in basic rates between large companies and SMEs implies that the benefit of the 
specific R&D tax incentives is smaller for SMEs (up to 100,000 euro) than for large companies. As partial 
exemption from payment of the withholding tax on the wages of R&D employees reduces the wage 
costs that can be deducted from turnover to determine taxable income, the reduction in the corporate 
tax rate increases the budgetary cost of the partial exemption schemes. 
Aside from apparently being more effective in raising R&D, the partial exemption from payment of the 
withholding tax has a clear advantage over tax incentives provided through corporate income taxation, 
from the perspective of market dynamism. R&D active start-ups and young firms often lack the profits 
to use corporate income tax incentives whereas they immediately benefit from the partial exemption 
from payment of the withholding tax on the wages of their R&D employees. The latter type of public 
support is therefore less biased against young firms than corporate income tax incentives.       
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Synthèse  
Le gouvernement fédéral belge a introduit plusieurs incitations fiscales en faveur de la recherche et du 
développement (R&D) des entreprises afin de concrétiser son engagement à porter les investissements 
en R&D à 3 % du PIB. Entre 2005 et 2007, quatre régimes accordant une dispense partielle de versement 
de précompte professionnel sur les salaires du personnel R&D ont été instaurés. En outre, à partir de 
2007, s’est ajoutée une possibilité de choix entre une déduction fiscale et un crédit d'impôt pour inves-
tissement en R&D. Enfin, une déduction fiscale à 80 % des revenus des brevets a été introduite en 2008. 
Bien que seule une minorité des entreprises actives dans la R&D recourent aux incitations fiscales, le 
nombre de bénéficiaires a augmenté progressivement avec le temps, tout particulièrement pour la dis-
pense partielle de versement de précompte professionnel sur les salaires du personnel R&D titulaire 
d’un master. En 2015, 1 670 entreprises y ont eu recours. En raison de la popularité croissante des inci-
tations fiscales et de trois augmentations successives du taux de dispense partielle du précompte, le coût 
budgétaire de ces incitations a considérablement augmenté. Alors que les aides publiques sous la forme 
d’incitations fiscales à la R&D représentaient 0,03 % du PIB en 2006, elles ont atteint 0,33 % en 2015. Par 
conséquent, la Belgique est devenue, en 2015, le pays de l’OCDE le plus généreux en matière d’incita-
tions fiscales à la R&D lorsqu’elles sont rapportées au PIB. 
Parallèlement, les dépenses de R&D par rapport au PIB, qui avaient sensiblement baissé entre 2001 et 
2005 en Belgique, sont passées de 1,81 % en 2006 à 2,47 % en 2015. La corrélation entre aide publique et 
dépenses de R&D est positive dans les pays de l'OCDE. Néanmoins, la Commission européenne notam-
ment, a récemment soulevé la question de savoir si certains pays ne dépassaient pas le niveau optimal 
d’aide publique à la R&D des entreprises.       
Cette étude présente les résultats de la troisième évaluation des incitations fiscales à la R&D introduites 
en Belgique entre 2005 et 2008. La première évaluation couvrait la période 2001-2009 et ne portait que 
sur quatre régimes de dispense partielle de versement du précompte professionnel sur les salaires du 
personnel R&D. La deuxième évaluation, qui englobait la période 2003-2011, évaluait aussi le crédit 
d'impôt à l'investissement en R&D et la déduction fiscale à 80 % des revenus des brevets. L’évaluation 
présentée ici porte sur la période 2003-2015.  
Puisque les incitations fiscales visent à augmenter les dépenses R&D des entreprises, cette évaluation 
étudie principalement la question de l'additionnalité d’input, soit la mesure dans laquelle l’aide pu-
blique crée de nouvelles activités de R&D. L’autonomie des entreprises dans leurs décisions de solliciter 
ou non des subventions ou des avantages fiscaux et dans les montants investis dans les activités de R&D 
complique l'estimation du lien causal entre aide publique et accroissement de la R&D. En l’absence 
d’expériences où l’aide publique est allouée de manière aléatoire aux entreprises, les estimations de ses 
effets doivent se fonder sur des données observées et tenir compte de l’autonomie de décision des en-
treprises pour établir une causalité. Toutes les techniques d'estimation existantes ont néanmoins leurs 
limites, et aucune ne peut être considérée comme supérieure. Comme pour les évaluations précédentes, 
cette étude présente les résultats de différentes méthodes d'estimation et met l'accent sur les conclusions 
qui semblent solides dans les différentes estimations.            
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L'évaluation s'appuie sur les informations détaillées contenues dans la base de données belge R&D Po-
licy Mix, qui regroupe plusieurs sources. Cette base de données contient des informations sur l’aide 
reçue par les entreprises sous la forme des différentes incitations fiscales et des subventions à la R&D et 
à l'innovation accordées par les agences régionales. Les données sur l’aide publique sont couplées avec 
informations sur les activités R&D des entreprises tirées des enquêtes bisannuelles sur la R&D, les don-
nées des comptes annuels des entreprises et les données sur le nombre de brevets délivrés. Cette base 
de données est plutôt unique en ce sens qu'elle fournit des renseignements, à l’échelle des entreprises, 
sur le montant de l'aide reçue par le biais de subventions et de chaque incitation fiscale. Ces données 
permettent d'estimer l'efficience de l'aide publique en établissant un lien entre le montant de l'aide et 
les dépenses de R&D dans l'entreprise sans la contrainte de variables binaires (l'entreprise reçoit ou non 
un soutien), comme cela semble être le cas dans la plupart des autres pays. En outre, étant donné que le 
montant de l'aide est fourni pour chaque régime, l'impact de chaque mesure individuelle d'incitation 
peut être estimé, en contrôlant pour l'aide allouée via d'autres mesures d'incitation pertinentes. La com-
plémentarité ou l’absence de complémentarité entre différents régimes d’aide peut également être éva-
luée.  
Les résultats présentés dans cette étude sont, pour la plupart, cohérents avec les conclusions des éva-
luations précédentes et fournissent des indications plus probantes pour certains régimes de dispense 
partielle. Comme dans son édition précédente, l’analyse fait apparaître des indications très solides d'ad-
ditionnalité d’input pour la dispense partielle de versement du précompte professionnel pour les cher-
cheurs titulaires d'un master. Par rapport à l’évaluation précédente, les indications d’efficience de la 
dispense partielle de précompte professionnel pour le personnel actif dans la coopération en matière de 
recherche se révèlent désormais très solides. La dispense partielle de versement de précompte profes-
sionnel en faveur des jeunes entreprises innovantes, dont l'additionnalité n'a guère été démontrée lors 
de l'évaluation précédente, donne désormais des résultats positifs robustes, en raison probablement du 
plus grand nombre d'observations. On relève également des indications plus solides d'additionnalité 
pour la dispense partielle de versement de précompte professionnel accordée au personnel R&D titu-
laire d'un doctorat ou d'un diplôme d’ingénieur civil.  
Étant donné que le taux de dispense est maintenant le même pour les titulaires d'un doctorat, d'un 
diplôme d'ingénieur civil et d'un master et que, par définition, les titulaires d'un doctorat et les ingé-
nieurs civils détiennent un master, la distinction entre les deux régimes de dispense partielle fondée sur 
le niveau de formation ne parait pas clairement utile. Depuis 2018, la dispense partielle a été étendue 
aux travailleurs R&D titulaires d’un bachelier académique ou professionnel dans des domaines 
d’études spécifiques. Ce dispositif est trop récent pour être inclus dans cette évaluation.    
Alors que cette troisième évaluation montre clairement, au même titre que la deuxième, que les quatre 
régimes de dispense partielle de versement de précompte professionnel contribuent au développement 
des activités de R&D elle ne dégage pas d’indications solides d’efficience pour le crédit d'impôt à la 
R&D et la déduction fiscale à 80 % des revenus des brevets. Pour les deux incitations fiscales, une seule 
des estimations est statistiquement significative et, même dans ce cas, l'additionnalité est limitée.  
Cette évaluation confirme les résultats d’évaluations précédentes selon lesquels l’additionnalité d’input 
diminue si les entreprises combinent différents dispositifs d’aide.  
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En Belgique, le coût budgétaire des incitations fiscales en faveur de la R&D a considérablement aug-
menté, sans aucun signe de ralentissement de la progression des aides publiques sous la forme d'inci-
tations fiscales à la R&D en pourcentage du PIB. Dès lors que le coût budgétaire est principalement 
généré par deux incitations fiscales pour lesquelles les évaluations dégagent peu d'indications d'effi-
cience, on peut penser qu'il existe une certaine marge de manœuvre pour limiter l'augmentation du coût 
budgétaire d'une manière qui n'entrave pas le potentiel des incitations fiscales à développer les activités 
de R&D.   
En 2016, la déduction fiscale pour revenus de brevets a été remplacée par une déduction fiscale pour 
revenus d'innovation. Le taux de déduction a été porté de 80 % à 85 %, mais conformément aux lignes 
directrices de l'OCDE sur l'érosion de la base d’imposition et le transfert de bénéfices (BEPS), certaines 
modalités réduisent la générosité de la déduction. Étant donné que les données R&D Policy Mix ne 
couvrent que la période 2003-2015, la nouvelle déduction fiscale relative à l’innovation n’a pu être éva-
luée. De toute évidence, le premier régime d’aide à envisager pour l'ajustement semble être le crédit 
d'impôt à la R&D. On pourrait envisager de limiter le montant total d’aide ou d’abaisser le taux de 
déduction au-delà d’un certain seuil, comme c’est le cas dans de nombreux autres pays. Les indications 
d'efficience décroissante de l’aide aux entreprises qui combinent différents dispositifs de soutien appel-
lent à coordonner l’aide publique et à réfléchir aux limites du montant global octroyé.   
Le gouvernement fédéral belge s’est accordé en 2017 sur la réforme de l'impôt des sociétés. L’un des 
principaux axes de la réforme est la réduction du taux de base de cet impôt. D'ici 2020, le taux de 33,99 % 
appliqué jusqu’à 2018 sera ramené à 25 % pour les grandes entreprises. Pour les PME, un taux de 20 % 
s'appliquera à la première tranche de 100 000 euros de bénéfices et un taux de 25 % au-delà. Compte 
tenu de la réduction du taux de l'impôt des sociétés, le coût budgétaire des incitations fiscales à la R&D 
fondées sur cet impôt sera plus faible qu'actuellement, pour un niveau donné d'investissement en R&D 
ou de revenu d'innovation. Paradoxalement, la différenciation des taux de base pour les grandes entre-
prises et les PME laisse à penser que le bénéfice des incitations fiscales spécifiques à la R&D est plus 
faible pour les PME (jusqu'à 100 000 euros) que pour les grandes entreprises. Comme la dispense par-
tielle de versement de précompte professionnel sur les salaires du personnel R&D réduit les coûts sala-
riaux qui peuvent être déduits du chiffre d'affaires pour déterminer le revenu imposable, la réduction 
du taux de l'impôt des sociétés accroît le coût budgétaire des régimes de dispense partielle. 
En comparaison avec les incitations fiscales octroyées dans le cadre de l'impôt des sociétés, la dispense 
partielle de versement de précompte professionnel est apparemment plus efficace pour le développe-
ment de la R&D et présente un net avantage du point de vue de la dynamique du marché. Les jeunes 
entreprises, notamment actives dans la R&D, ne dégagent pas souvent de bénéfices suffisants pour être 
éligibles aux incitations fiscales liées aux bénéfices imposables, alors qu'elles bénéficient immédiate-
ment de la dispense partielle de versement de précompte professionnel sur les salaires de leur personnel 
R&D. Cette forme d’aide publique est dès lors moins défavorable aux jeunes entreprises que les incita-
tions fiscales s’appuyant sur les bénéfices des entreprises. 
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Synthese  
In het kader van haar verbintenis om de uitgaven voor onderzoek en ontwikkeling (O&O) te verhogen 
tot 3 % van het bbp, heeft de Belgische federale regering een aantal fiscale maatregelen genomen om de 
O&O-activiteiten van ondernemingen te ondersteunen. Tussen 2005 en 2007 werden er vier maatregelen 
voorgesteld die ondernemingen een gedeeltelijke vrijstelling van bedrijfsvoorheffing op de lonen van 
hun O&O-personeel verlenen. Daarnaast kunnen ondernemingen vanaf 2007 kiezen tussen een belas-
tingaftrek en een belastingkrediet voor O&O-investeringen en in 2008 werd een belastingaftrek van 
80 % voor octrooi-inkomsten ingevoerd.     
Hoewel slechts een minderheid van de ondernemingen die actief zijn op het gebied van O&O gebruik-
maakt van de belastingvoordelen, is het aantal begunstigden in de loop van de jaren geleidelijk toege-
nomen, met name voor de gedeeltelijke vrijstelling van bedrijfsvoorheffing op de lonen van O&O-per-
soneel met een masterdiploma. In 2015 maakten 1 670 ondernemingen van dit voordeel gebruik. Door 
de toenemende populariteit van de belastingvoordelen en de drie opeenvolgende verhogingen van het 
percentage van de gedeeltelijke vrijstelling van bedrijfsvoorheffing zijn de budgettaire kosten aanzien-
lijk gestegen.  Terwijl de overheidssteun via belastingvoordelen voor O&O in 2006 0,03 % van het bbp 
bedroeg, was dat in 2015 0,33 %. Bijgevolg was België tegen 2015 het OESO-land met de meest gene-
reuze belastingvoordelen voor O&O in verhouding tot het bbp. 
Tegelijkertijd zijn de O&O-uitgaven in verhouding tot het bbp, die tussen 2001 en 2005 in België sterk 
waren gedaald, gestegen van 1,81 % in 2006 tot 2,47 % in 2015. De correlatie tussen overheidssteun en 
O&O-uitgaven is positief in alle OESO-landen. Niettemin heeft de Europese Commissie onlangs de 
vraag gesteld of sommige landen het optimale niveau van overheidssteun voor O&O van ondernemin-
gen niet overschrijden. 
Deze paper presenteert de resultaten van een derde evaluatie van de belastingvoordelen voor O&O die 
België tussen 2005 en 2008 heeft ingevoerd. De eerste evaluatie had betrekking op de periode 2001-2009 
en bestudeerde alleen de vier maatregelen van gedeeltelijke vrijstelling van bedrijfsvoorheffing op de 
lonen van O&O-personeel. De tweede evaluatie die betrekking had op de periode 2003-2011 be-
schouwde ook het belastingkrediet voor O&O-investeringen en de belastingaftrek van 80 % voor oc-
trooi-inkomsten. De evaluatie in deze paper heeft betrekking op de periode 2003-2015.  
Aangezien de belastingvoordelen bedoeld zijn om de O&O-uitgaven van ondernemingen te verhogen, 
wordt in deze evaluatie vooral gekeken naar de inputadditionaliteit, d.w.z. de mate waarin overheids-
steun additionele O&O-activiteiten kan aanmoedigen. Het feit dat ondernemingen autonoom beslissen 
of ze subsidies of belastingvoordelen aanvragen en welk bedrag ze in O&O-activiteiten zullen investe-
ren, bemoeilijkt de raming van de causale impact van de overheidssteun.  Bij gebrek aan experimenten 
waarbij de overheidssteun willekeurig aan ondernemingen wordt toegekend, moet de schatting van de 
impact ervan worden gebaseerd op waargenomen gegevens en rekening houden met de beslissingsau-
tonomie van ondernemingen, om ‘causale’ effecten vast te stellen. Helaas hebben alle bestaande schat-
tingstechnieken beperkingen en kan geen enkele als superieur worden beschouwd. Net als bij de 
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eerdere evaluaties presenteert deze paper de resultaten van verschillende schattingsprocedures en legt 
daarbij de nadruk op conclusies die robuust lijken in de verschillende ramingen.                     
De evaluatie is gebaseerd op gedetailleerde informatie uit de Belgische R&D Policy Mix databank, die 
verschillende bronnen combineert.  Deze databank bevat informatie over de steun aan ondernemingen 
via de verschillende belastingvoordelen alsook via subsidies voor O&O en innovatie die door geweste-
lijke agentschappen worden toegekend.  De gegevens over overheidssteun worden gekoppeld aan in-
formatie over de O&O-activiteiten op ondernemingsniveau uit de tweejaarlijkse O&O-enquêtes, infor-
matie uit de jaarrekeningen van ondernemingen en gegevens over het aantal verleende octrooien in 
België.  Deze databank is vrij uniek omdat ze informatie op ondernemingsniveau verschaft over het 
bedrag van de steun die via subsidies en elk belastingvoordeel is ontvangen. De gegevens maken het 
dus mogelijk de efficiëntie van de overheidssteun te ramen door het bedrag van de steun te koppelen 
aan het niveau van de O&O-uitgaven op ondernemingsniveau, zonder de beperking van binaire varia-
belen voor steun (de onderneming ontvangt steun of niet), zoals in de meeste andere landen het geval 
lijkt te zijn. Aangezien het steunbedrag voor elke steunmaatregel is vastgesteld, kan de impact van elke 
individuele maatregel worden geschat, waarbij rekening wordt gehouden met de steun die door andere 
relevante maatregelen wordt verleend.  Ook de complementariteit of het gebrek aan complementariteit 
tussen verschillende steunmaatregelen kan worden beoordeeld.   
De in deze paper gepresenteerde resultaten zijn grotendeels in overeenstemming met de conclusies van 
de eerdere evaluaties, hoewel er meer robuuste aanwijzingen zijn voor sommige maatregelen van ge-
deeltelijke vrijstelling.  Net als in de vorige evaluatie zijn er zeer robuuste aanwijzingen van inputaddi-
tionaliteit voor de gedeeltelijke vrijstelling van bedrijfsvoorheffing op de lonen van O&O-personeel met 
een masterdiploma. In tegenstelling tot de vorige evaluatie zijn er nu echter ook zeer robuuste aanwij-
zingen voor de efficiëntie van de gedeeltelijke vrijstelling van bedrijfsvoorheffing op de lonen van O&O-
personeel dat betrokken is bij onderzoekssamenwerking. De gedeeltelijke vrijstelling van bedrijfsvoor-
heffing voor Jonge Innoverende Ondernemingen, waarvan de additionaliteit in de vorige evaluatie nau-
welijks is aangetoond, levert nu robuuste positieve resultaten op, waarschijnlijk door het hogere aantal 
waarnemingen. Er zijn ook meer robuuste aanwijzingen van additionaliteit voor de gedeeltelijke vrij-
stelling van bedrijfsvoorheffing voor O&O-personeel met een doctoraatsdiploma of een diploma van 
burgerlijk ingenieur.   
Aangezien het vrijstellingspercentage hetzelfde is voor doctors of burgerlijk ingenieurs en masters, en 
een doctor en burgerlijk ingenieur per definitie een masterdiploma hebben, is het nut van het onder-
scheid tussen de twee maatregelen van gedeeltelijke vrijstelling op basis van het opleidingsniveau van 
het O&O-personeel niet duidelijk. Sinds 2018 kunnen ondernemingen ook een gedeeltelijke vrijstelling 
krijgen voor O&O-personeel met een bachelordiploma in de in aanmerking komende studierichtingen. 
Die steunmaatregel werd te recent ingevoerd om in deze evaluatie te worden opgenomen.    
Terwijl de derde evaluatie duidelijk aantoont dat de vier maatregelen van gedeeltelijke vrijstelling van 
bedrijfsvoorheffing additionele O&O-uitgaven generen, blijken er, net zoals in de vorige evaluatie, wei-
nig robuuste aanwijzingen te zijn voor de efficiëntie van het belastingkrediet voor O&O en de belas-
tingaftrek van 80 % voor octrooi-inkomsten. Voor de beide belastingvoordelen is slechts één van de 
geschatte coëfficiënten statistisch significant positief en zelfs dan is de additionaliteit beperkt.  
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Deze evaluatie bevestigt de bevindingen van eerdere evaluaties dat de inputadditionaliteit afneemt als 
ondernemingen verschillende steunmaatregelen combineren. 
De budgettaire kosten van de belastingvoordelen voor O&O in België zijn sterk toegenomen zonder dat 
er aanwijzingen zijn dat de stijging van de overheidssteun via die voordelen als percentage van het bbp 
afneemt. Het feit dat het grootste deel van de budgettaire kosten te wijten is aan twee belastingvoorde-
len waarvoor de evaluaties weinig aanwijzingen voor efficiëntie bieden, suggereert dat er enige speel-
ruimte is om de stijging van de budgettaire kosten te beperken op een manier die de mogelijkheden van 
de belastingvoordelen om O&O-activiteiten te stimuleren niet onderdrukt.  
In 2016 werd de belastingaftrek voor octrooi-inkomsten vervangen door een belastingaftrek voor inno-
vatie-inkomsten. Het aftrekpercentage werd verhoogd van 80 % tot 85 %, maar in lijn met de BEPS (Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting)-richtlijnen van de OESO verminderen sommige kenmerken de generositeit 
van de aftrek. Aangezien de R&D Policy Mix data de periode 2003-2015 bestrijken, kon de nieuwe belas-
tingaftrek voor innovatie niet worden geëvalueerd. De meest voor de hand liggende steunmaatregel die 
voor aanpassing in aanmerking komt, lijkt daarom het belastingkrediet voor O&O te zijn. Een beperking 
van het totale steunbedrag of een lager aftrekpercentage boven een bepaald plafond zou kunnen worden 
overwogen, zoals in veel andere landen het geval is. De aanwijzingen dat ondernemingen die verschil-
lende steunmaatregelen combineren, steeds minder doeltreffend worden, vragen om coördinatie en re-
flectie over het beperken van het totale bedrag aan overheidssteun dat ondernemingen ontvangen.   
De Belgische federale regering bereikte in 2017 een akkoord over de hervorming van de vennootschaps-
belasting. Een van de belangrijkste kenmerken is de verlaging van het basistarief van de vennootschaps-
belasting. In 2020 wordt het tarief verlaagd van 33,99 %, dat van toepassing was tot en met 2018, naar 
25 % voor grote ondernemingen. Voor kmo's geldt een tarief van 20 % voor winsten tot 100 000 euro en 
25 % boven dat niveau. Als gevolg van het verlaagde vennootschapsbelastingtarief zullen de budget-
taire kosten van belastingvoordelen voor O&O op basis van de vennootschapsbelasting, voor een be-
paald niveau van O&O-investeringen of innovatie-inkomsten, lager uitvallen dan nu het geval is. Iro-
nisch genoeg impliceert de differentiatie van de tarieven tussen grote ondernemingen en kmo's dat het 
voordeel van de specifieke belastingvoordelen voor O&O kleiner is voor kmo’s (tot 100 000 euro) dan 
voor grote ondernemingen. Aangezien de gedeeltelijke vrijstelling van bedrijfsvoorheffing op de lonen 
van O&O-personeel de loonkosten vermindert die kunnen worden afgetrokken van de omzet om het 
belastbaar inkomen te bepalen, verhoogt de verlaging van het vennootschapsbelastingtarief de budget-
taire kosten van de maatregelen van gedeeltelijke vrijstelling. 
De gedeeltelijke vrijstelling van bedrijfsvoorheffing heeft niet alleen een groter effect op het verhogen 
van O&O, maar heeft ook een duidelijk voordeel ten opzichte van belastingvoordelen via de vennoot-
schapsbelasting, vanuit het oogpunt van marktdynamiek. O&O-actieve jonge ondernemingen hebben 
vaak niet de winst om gebruik te maken van vennootschapsbelastingvoordelen, terwijl zij onmiddellijk 
gebruik kunnen maken van de gedeeltelijke vrijstelling van bedrijfsvoorheffing op de lonen van hun 
O&O-personeel. Deze laatste vorm van overheidssteun valt dus minder in het nadeel uit van jonge on-
dernemingen dan de vennootschapsbelastingvoordelen.  
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1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the tax incentives that were introduced by the Belgian federal 
government in support of business R&D. It also shows the evolution in the use and budgetary cost of 
these tax incentives and the trend in R&D intensity.  
1.1. Tax incentives for business R&D in Belgium 
In fulfilment of its commitment to the Europe 2020 target to raise expenditures on research and devel-
opment (R&D) to 3% of GDP, the Belgian federal government introduced different tax incentives in 
support of R&D activities by companies.  
Between 2005 and 2007, four schemes were introduced that provide a partial exemption from payment 
of the withholding tax on the wages of R&D personnel: for companies involved in research cooperation 
with a university, a higher education institution or a scientific institution; for Young Innovative Com-
panies (YIC)1 and two schemes based on the educational degree of R&D employees. Since January 2018, 
companies can also benefit from a partial exemption for the remuneration of R&D employees with a 
bachelor’s degree in qualifying study fields. The rate of exemption for this recent extension currently 
amounts to 40% but it will be raised to 80% by January 2020, equal to the current rate of exemption for 
the four existing schemes.2 
Belgian companies can choose, as of 2007, between a tax deduction or a tax credit for investment in R&D 
(tangible and intangible fixed assets and patents)3. The tax deduction can be carried forward for an 
unlimited period if profits are insufficient to benefit from the deduction whereas the part of the tax 
credit that is not used after 5 years, is refunded. For 2019 the rate of deduction is 13.5% of the investment 
or acquisition value for a one-off deduction and 20.5% of the annual depreciation for a spread deduc-
tion. 
From 2008 onwards, the federal government grants a deduction of 80% of qualifying gross patent in-
come from the taxable basis for corporate income taxation. In 2016 the tax deduction for patent income 
was replaced by a tax deduction for innovation income. The new deduction is less generous as, in line 
with the OECD guidelines on Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS), the tax deduction on innovation in-
come applies to net income rather than gross income4 and furthermore applies a Nexus ratio which links 
innovation income to the location where the costs to generate the eligible income are incurred. On the 
other hand, in addition to income from patents, the deduction also applies to income from plant variety 
                                                          
1  A Young Innovative Company is defined (see Belgian Science Policy, 2006) as a company which: 
- carries out research projects; 
- has been set up for less than 10 years before January 1 of the year during which the advance payment exemption is granted; 
- is not set up within the framework of concentration, a restructuration, an extension of a pre-existing activity or resumption 
of such activities; 
- has made expenditures on R&D representing at least 15% of the total costs in the foregoing taxable period. 
2  The federal government also introduced a partial exemption from payment of the withholding tax for universities and col-
leges, in 2003, and for recognized scientific institutions, in 2004. This report only considers the four schemes for companies.  
3  A tax deduction reduces the taxable income whereas a tax credit reduces the amount of taxes that is due.  
4  Gross income includes R&D expenditures for which a tax deduction already applies.  
WORKING PAPER 4-19 
11 
or breeders’ rights; orphan medicinal products; data or market exclusivity and copyright-protected soft-
ware and the rate of deduction is 85% instead of 80%. The patent income deduction is gradually phased 
out through a grandfather (transition) period that ends June 2021. 
OECD (2018 a) provides more details on R&D tax incentives in Belgium and a comparison with other 
OECD countries. 
1.2. Use of R&D tax incentives 
Graph 1 shows the evolution of the number of firms that received a partial exemption from payment of 
the withholding tax on the wages of R&D personnel, based on the most recent available information.5 
List 1 refers to the list of educational degrees for which a partial exemption was introduced in 2006 (PhD 
in exact or applied sciences, PhD in (veterinary) medicine or a civil engineering degree) and List 2 to 
the degrees for which an exemption was introduced in 2007 (master’s degree in sciences, except for 
social and human sciences). The partial exemption for firms involved in research cooperation with a 
university, a higher education institution or a scientific institution was introduced in 2005 and the 
scheme for Young Innovative Companies was introduced in 2006. 
 
The graph shows the steady increase in the number of firms that benefit from the two schemes of partial 
exemption for R&D employees based on the educational degree, which are more general than the ex-
emption for research cooperation or for YIC. In 2010, the number of firms that benefitted from a partial 
exemption for R&D employees with a List 2 degree exceeds the number of firms that benefitted from a 
                                                          
5  This does not include information on the tax deduction for innovation income, introduced mid-2016, or the partial exemption 
from the withholding tax for R&D personnel with a bachelor’s degree, introduced in 2018.    
Graph 1  Number of firms benefitting from partial exemption from withholding tax on remuneration R&D personnel 
(2005-2015) 
 
 
      
Source:  Belgian Chamber of Representatives, written questions and answers 2016. List 1: PhD in exact or applied sciences, PhD in (veterinary) medicine or a civil 
engineering degree, List 2: Master’s degree in (applied) sciences, except for social and human sciences. 
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partial exemption for R&D employees with a List 1 degree. The gap between the two schemes increased 
between 2010 and 2015. This evolution seems to indicate that as the rate of exemption is the same for 
both lists and List 1 contains List 2 (a researcher with a PhD also has a master’s degree) many companies 
only apply for the partial exemption based on List 2. The number of Young Innovative Companies sta-
bilized and the number of firms that benefit from a partial exemption for research cooperation decreased 
slightly from 2013 onwards.        
Graph 2 shows the evolution, between 2008 and 2015, of the number of firms that used an incentive 
through corporate income taxation. Most firms opt for a tax deduction rather than a tax credit for R&D 
investment. All three schemes show a similar pattern, with a gradual increase up to 2013 and a sudden 
surge in 2014, followed by a substantial drop in 2015.    
 
The increasing popularity of R&D tax incentives is reflected in the budgetary cost6 as shown in graph 3. 
The budgetary cost of the four schemes of partial exemption from payment of the withholding tax (total 
amount for four schemes shown in the graph) increased gradually but the budgetary cost of the tax 
credit for R&D investment and the tax deduction for patent income show a much steeper increase. These 
two tax incentives account for the bulk of the budgetary cost of R&D tax incentives in Belgium. Alt-
hough more firms use a tax deduction for R&D investment than a tax credit, the budgetary cost of the 
latter is substantially higher, indicating that large R&D firms more frequently than small firms opt for 
a tax credit rather than a tax deduction. The tax deduction for patent income is also predominantly used 
by large firms as revealed by the high budgetary cost despite the relatively small number of firms that 
use this incentive. The total budgetary cost of tax incentives for business R&D increased from about 254 
million euro in 2008 to 1.7 billion euro in 2016. The tax credit for R&D investment, despite having 
                                                          
6  The budgetary cost is defined as the tax revenue lost due to the incentive. 
Graph 2  Number of firms benefitting from R&D tax incentives through corporate income taxation (2008-2015) 
 
 
Source: Belgian Chamber of Representatives, written questions and answers 2016. 
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decreased by more than 100 million euro compared to 2015, accounted for 42% of the budgetary cost of 
all R&D tax incentives in 2016 and the tax deduction for patent income for another 37%.  
 
1.3. R&D intensity 
The tax incentives in support of business R&D provided by the federal government aim at raising the 
R&D intensity of Belgium, which as can be seen in graph 4, coincidentally bottomed out in 2005, the 
year when the first R&D tax incentive was introduced. Graph 4 shows R&D spending by the business 
enterprise sector (BERD) as well as gross domestic R&D spending (GERD) for Belgium, both as a per-
centage of GDP for the period 1995-2016. From 2006, both BERD and GERD gradually increased relative 
to GDP although the increase appears to taper off from 2012 onwards (data for 2016 are provisional). 
According to the OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators, with a 0.48% increase in BERD rela-
tive to GDP, between 2006 and 2016, Belgium ranked fourth in the list of countries in terms of strongest 
increase, after South Korea, Slovenia and Austria. Graph 3 and 4 indicate that the strong increase in the 
use and the budgetary cost of the R&D tax incentives that were introduced between 2005 and 2008 
coincides with a substantial rise of R&D intensity. This correlation obviously does not prove any causal 
impact of tax incentives.  
The budgetary impact of tax incentives in support of R&D receives heightened attention in discussions 
between the European Commission and Member States as questions arise as to whether some EU coun-
tries have moved beyond the optimal level of public support to business R&D (Council of the European 
Union 2018, European Commission 2018).    
Graph 3  Budgetary cost of tax incentives for business R&D (2005-2016) 
Million euro 
 
 Source: Official statistics from the Annex to the "Budget des Voies et Moyens - Middelenbegroting" - Inventory of tax exemptions, deductions and credits having 
an impact on federal revenue. Data on the tax deduction for patent income not available for 2013. 
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According to the OECD R&D Tax Incentive Database (http://www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm), in 
2015 Belgium was the OECD country with the most generous tax support of business R&D, relative to 
GDP, just before France but well ahead of most other OECD countries. The comparison of the evolution 
in Belgium and France is rather telling. Graph 5 shows government support through tax incentives in 
support of business R&D as a percentage of GDP in Belgium and France over the period 2005-2015.  
The comparison between countries of public support for business R&D should be considered with cau-
tion given some issues that still need to be settled to assure cross-country comparability. Valenduc 
(2019) shows, for the case of Belgium, that not accounting for the interaction of different support 
schemes in statistics on government tax relief for R&D tax expenditure (GTARD) results in the overes-
timation of public support as the partial exemption schemes reduce the total wage costs that can be 
deducted from revenue considered for corporate income taxation. As it reduces deductible costs, part 
of the budgetary cost of the partial exemption of the withholding tax on the wages of R&D employees 
is recuperated through corporate income taxation.    
The most important tax incentive for business R&D in France is the Crédit d’Impôt Recherche (CIR). In 
2004, the “Jeune Entreprise Innovante” scheme provided young innovative SMEs with a reduction of 
wage contributions. In 2013 a specific scheme was introduced in support of SMEs (Credit d’Impôt In-
novation - CII). In France, firms can also benefit from a reduced corporate tax rate on income and capital 
gains from patents. The French patent box is set to be reformed in 2019 in accordance with the OECD 
guidelines on Base Erosion Profit Shifting, as Belgium did in 2016 with the replacement of the patent 
box with a tax deduction on innovation income.  
The French CIR has been reformed several times since its introduction in 1983. A major reform occurred 
in 2008. The cap of 16 million euro was dropped but more importantly the tax credit would henceforth 
apply to the volume of R&D expenditures rather than to the increase in R&D expenditures. The tax rate 
Graph 4  Business enterprise (BERD) and gross domestic (GERD) spending on R&D (1995-2016) 
% of GDP 
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators. Information for 2016 is provisional.   
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was set at 30%, with a more generous rate of 50% and 40% for the first and second year of CIR use. The 
30% rate applies to R&D expenditures up to 100 million euro. Above 100 million euro, the rate is 5% 
(Dortet-Bernadet and Sicsic 2017). The shift from an incremental tax credit to a volume-based tax credit 
resulted in a dramatic increase of the budgetary cost in 2008, as can be clearly seen in graph 5. The cost 
further increased relative to GDP up to 2010, after which it stabilized.  
 
The decrease in the general costs of R&D that are eligible for the CIR, explain the stabilization in the 
budgetary cost, from 2011 onwards (Mulkay and Mairesse 2018). Moreover, the more generous rates for 
the first years of CIR use were reduced in 2011 and dropped altogether in 2013. Harfi and Lallement 
(2019) review the rather mixed results from evaluations of the French CIR. 
Government support through R&D tax incentives in Belgium was much lower than in France up to 2010 
but from then onwards the gap started to close due to the stabilization in France and the continuous rise 
in Belgium, with Belgium surpassing France in 2015. 7   
In 2016 the tax credit for R&D investment accounted for 42% of the total budgetary cost of R&D tax 
incentives in Belgium. The rate of the R&D tax credit in Belgium is 13.5% which is well below the 30% 
rate in France but contrary to France the rate applies without any ceiling.8 For the tax deduction for 
patent income there is also no cap or ceiling above which a lower rate of deduction applies. For the 
moment there are no changes in the Belgian R&D tax incentives that would lead to expect a slowdown 
in the budgetary cost although the impact of the replacement, mid-2016, of the tax deduction for patent 
income by a tax deduction for innovation income remains uncertain. Some features reduce the 
                                                          
7  According to the latest data, government support through R&D tax incentives relative to GDP in Belgium would have de-
creased from 0.33% in 2015 to 0.30% in 2016 but data for 2016 are provisional and subject to change. As graph 3 shows, 
according to recent data, the rise in the budgetary cost of R&D tax incentives in Belgium did not appear to abate in 2016. For 
France data for 2016 are not available. Therefore 2016 is not considered in graph 5.  
8  The corporate income tax rate in France of 34.43% will be reduced to 28% in 2020.  
Graph 5  Government support through R&D tax incentives Belgium and France (2005-2015)  
% of GDP 
 
Source: R&D tax expenditure and direct government funding of BERD (https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=RDTAX) Data downloaded 16th January 2019 
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generosity of the tax deduction for innovation income relative to the previous tax deduction for patent 
income but on the other hand the deduction for innovation income applies to a broader income base 
and the rate of deduction is 85% instead of 80%. Moreover, the tax deduction for patent income will 
only be phased out by 2021. In addition, since January 2018 a scheme of partial exemption from payment 
of the withholding tax for R&D employees with a bachelors’ degree is in effect, with the current exemp-
tion of 40% set to be raised to 80% by 2020.  
The reform of Belgian corporate income taxation that was agreed upon in 2017 will affect the budgetary 
cost of R&D tax incentives. The corporate income tax rate will be reduced from 33.99%, which was 
applicable up to 2018, to 25% for large companies by 2020. For SMEs a rate of 20% will apply up to 
100,000 euro in profits and 25% above that level. The lower tax rate will reduce the budgetary cost of 
the R&D tax incentives based on corporate income taxation (tax deduction/tax credit for R&D invest-
ment and the tax deduction for innovation income). Somewhat ironically, due to the differentiation in 
tax rates the benefit of the specific R&D tax incentives is smaller for SMEs (up to 100,000 euro) than for 
large companies.  
On the other hand, as partial exemption from payment of the withholding tax on the wages of R&D 
employees reduces the wage costs that can be deducted from turnover to determine taxable income, the 
reduction in the basic corporate tax rates increases the budgetary cost of the partial exemption schemes. 
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2. Research question and method of evaluation 
The rationale to provide public support for R&D activities of private companies, rests primarily on the 
assumption that, due to market failures, private firms will invest less in R&D than socially optimal. By 
providing subsidies or tax incentives, governments aim at encouraging firms to perform R&D activities 
that they would not consider without support.9 The efficiency of public support can be assessed by the 
extent to which the support stimulates additional private R&D activities.  
European Commission (2014) discusses the requirements of evaluations of state aid.10 Evaluation should 
include precise questions on the impact of public support that can be answered quantitatively, with 
necessary supporting evidence. The questions should be relevant to the objectives of the support 
schemes. The European Commission considers three levels to classify the impact of public support: 
– Direct impact (for example, impact on the activities of the beneficiaries, different effects according to 
the characteristics of beneficiaries such as size or industry), 
– Indirect impact (for example, spillover effects of the support on the activity of other firms or on other 
regions, aggregate effects on competition and trade), 
– Proportionality and appropriateness (for example, is the public support proportionate to the prob-
lem that is addressed? Could the same effects have been obtained with less support or different 
support schemes). 
As pointed out by European Commission (2014), most evaluations address the direct impact as it is 
more straightforward to assess direct effects than the two other levels. Assessment of the direct impact 
is however also relevant for the other levels as it provides indications of indirect effects and possible 
distortions. If support does not appear to incentivize beneficiaries, it can be assumed to be distortive as 
it provides beneficiaries with windfall gains.  
To avoid a selection bias in the evaluation, relevant differences between beneficiaries of public support 
and non-beneficiaries should be accounted for. The appropriate method to address the selection issue 
depends on the design of the support scheme but it should be recognized that all methods have limita-
tions and are only valid under specific assumptions. European Commission (2014) rightly argues that a 
forthright recognition and discussion of these limitations and assumptions is crucial for the credibility 
of the evaluation. It further points out that if firms benefit from several support schemes, all relevant 
schemes should be controlled for.  
The potential selection bias in public support to business R&D is explicitly acknowledged in this eval-
uation.  
                                                          
9     A more detailed discussion of the rationale of public support to business R&D and the advantage and limitations of subsidies 
and tax incentives to stimulate additional R&D activities is provided by Dumont (2012). 
10  Not all R&D tax incentives are considered as state aid as defined by Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. In principle state aid is prohibited unless it is compatible with the internal market, according to Articles 
107(2) and 107(3) of the Treaty. In 2014 the European Commission presented its Framework for State Aid for Research and Devel-
opment and Innovation which relaxes state aid rules for public support to R&D as the promotion of research, development and 
innovation is an important Union objective laid down in Article 179 of the Treaty and R&D is identified as a key driver for 
achieving the Europe 2020 strategy objectives of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.  
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Recognizing the limitations of all procedures that try to tackle the selection issue, the results of several 
methods are reported. Conclusions emphasize results that are robust across different estimations. Given 
the need to control for all relevant forms of public support, in addition to all tax incentives, the substan-
tial direct support (subsidies) provided by regions is included in all estimations, turning to good account 
the detailed information contained in the R&D Policy Mix database.     
Given the rationale of the R&D tax incentives that were introduced by the federal government, the main 
research question of this evaluation concerns input additionality: 
How much additional R&D expenditures result from the tax incentives provided by 
the federal government? 
Complementary assessment considers behavioural additionality, the potential impact of tax incentives on 
the characteristics of R&D activities (for example, share of R&D expenditures that target basic or applied 
research or experimental development) and output additionality, the impact of tax incentives on the out-
put of firms (for example, effects on profits or productivity).   
The major difficulty in assessing the efficiency of public support is establishing its causal impact. Private 
companies decide autonomously how much they will spend on R&D activities and whether to apply 
for public support. As such it is not straightforward to assess whether public support stimulates addi-
tional R&D or rather subsidizes R&D activities that firms would carry out anyway. 11   
This paper does not consider a more comprehensive evaluation of tax incentives such as a cost benefit 
analysis which would include a calculation of spillovers, administration cost, compliance costs and op-
portunity costs or a general equilibrium analysis (see Mohnen 2017).  
    
 
                                                          
11  A more detailed description of difficulties in establishing causal effects and technical details on the different estimation pro-
cedures can be found in Dumont (2015). 
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3. Data 
This chapter provides a description of the data that are used for the evaluation of the federal R&D tax 
benefits and some descriptive statistics on the use and combination of the different schemes of public 
support for business R&D.  
3.1. R&D Policy Mix database 
As for the two previous evaluations (Dumont 2013, 2015), the data used in this evaluation are provided 
by the R&D Policy Mix database, created by the Federal Public Service Finance. In the database, infor-
mation from the Belgian biennial R&D survey, provided by the Federal Science Policy Office, is linked 
to data on the direct support (subsidies) for R&D and innovation provided by the regions and data on 
the tax incentives granted by the federal government (partial exemption from advance payment of the 
withholding tax for R&D personnel; tax credit for investment in R&D and the deduction of 80% of qual-
ifying gross patent income). The database also contains information, from the National Social Security 
Office, on innovation premiums granted by companies to employees who have created added value by 
innovation. The innovation premium consists in an exemption from personal income tax as well as ex-
emption from social security contributions. The Federal Public Service Economy provides data on the 
number of patents granted by the Belgian Office for Intellectual Property. The data are matched with 
information from annual accounts (for example, value added, firm age and number of employees). The 
first evaluation covered the period 2001-2009 and the second evaluation the period 2003-2011. This eval-
uation considers four additional years, 2012-2015. As such the evaluation does not consider the two 
most recent changes in federal tax incentives to business R&D: the tax deduction for innovation income, 
introduced in 2016, and the partial exemption from payment of the withholding tax for R&D personnel 
with a bachelor’s degree in qualifying study fields, which is provided since January 2018.  
The R&D Policy Mix database contains information on the total amount of support received by individ-
ual firms, through direct support (subsidies) as well as through indirect support (tax incentives). This 
permits to link the amount of support received by firms to their level of R&D expenditures without the 
need to be confined to binary variables for public support (firm receives support or not) as appears to 
be the case for most other countries. It also allows to assess individual schemes while controlling for 
other relevant channels of support to business R&D.    
In view of the categorization of innovation policy instruments by Borrás and Edquist (2013), the scope 
of the policy mix considered in this evaluation is however limited. They consider three categories of 
instruments: 
1. Regulatory instruments (for example, intellectual property rights and competition policy), 
2. Economic and financial instruments,  
3. Soft instruments (for example, recommendations or voluntary technical standards),  
and four categories that instruments can target: 
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1. Provision of knowledge inputs to the innovation process, 
2. Demand-side activities (for example, creating new product markets), 
3. Provision of constituents for innovation systems (for example, creation of innovation networks), 
4. Support services for innovating firms (for example, incubator activities). 
The evaluation reported in this paper only considers the impact of financial instruments (2nd category 
of instruments) on the provision of knowledge inputs (1st category of innovation activities). A systemic 
assessment of the complementarity between all existing instruments of innovation policy in Belgium is 
clearly warranted but beyond the scope of this paper. 
By including the total amount of direct support received by firms as a single variable, the evaluation 
furthermore does not assess the substantial mix of policy instruments provided by the three regions in 
support of R&D and innovation. The direct support variable is included as it is necessary to control for 
all relevant support schemes but the estimates of the efficiency of direct support should be considered 
with caution as they do not reflect the diversity of policy instruments within and between regions. The 
focus in this evaluation is on the efficiency of the tax incentives provided by the federal government.     
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the average and median amount of support for regional subsidies and the different R&D 
tax incentives for firms, in 2015. As shown in graph 3, the tax deduction for R&D investment has a 
relatively low budgetary impact. According to official data the budgetary cost for 2014 was 40 million 
euro. With 500 firms benefitting from this deduction, this implies an average amount of 80,109 euro per 
firm. Data on the tax deduction for R&D investment is not available for the years 2013 up to 2015. Most 
analyses and estimations in this evaluation will only consider the support schemes for which data is 
available for the entire period up to 2015. As table 1 shows, the average and median amount of support 
in 2012, the most recent year available for this tax incentive in the Policy Mix database, are rather low, 
in line with the official data for 2015.     
The substantial difference between the average and the median amount of support reveals the skewness 
of support, in line with the strong skewness of R&D expenditures as shown in table 2. The partial ex-
emption for R&D employees with a master’s degree is by far the most popular tax incentive, with 1,641 
firms benefitting from this support scheme in 2015.12 Firms can only benefit from the tax credit if there 
are enough profits after all applicable tax deductions. If the amount of the tax credit exceeds profits 
firms can only benefit from the tax credit to the extent of the profits. As mentioned in the introduction, 
the part of the R&D tax credit that is not used after five years, is refunded.  
                                                          
12  The total amount of public support and the number of firms benefitting from the different schemes do not fully match the 
official statistics reported in chapter 2 as the R&D Policy Mix database does not contain all beneficiaries and tax benefits are 
fully attributed to the year of R&D activities to which they apply. The descriptive statistics reported in this section are indic-
ative and should not be considered as official statistics.      
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Table 1  Average and median amount of public R&D support and number of firms benefitting in 2015  
In euro 
 Average Median Number of firms 
Regional subsidy 134548 50000 1094 
Research cooperation 65038 19966 216 
Young Innovative Company 34171 17931 326 
PhDs and civil engineers 217183 35503 922 
Master 146075 35582 1641 
Tax credit R&D investment 2632834 41356 322 
Tax deduction R&D investment (2012)  36006 1518 270 
Tax deduction 80% patent income 1185966 63226 398 
Note:  The second column shows the average amount of public support for companies that benefitted from the given instrument in 2015. The 
third column shows the median amount of public support and the final column the number of firms that benefitted from the support. 
The gap between the average and the median amount is very large for the tax credit and the tax deduc-
tion of 80% of patent income. These two tax incentives are more skewed than the other schemes of public 
support, as can also be seen in table 2, which shows the share in R&D expenditures and public support 
in 2015, by quartile (each of four equal groups into which the population of firms can be divided ac-
cording to a given criterion, in this case the level of R&D expenditures or the amount of public support).  
Table 2  Share of each quartile in R&D expenditures and public support for R&D in 2015 
In % 
 First quartile Second quartile Third quartile Fourth quartile 
R&D expenditures 0 1 4 94 
Regional subsidy 2 7 14 77 
Research cooperation 1 5 13 81 
Young Innovative Company 3 9 19 68 
PhDs and civil engineers 1 3 7 89 
Master 1 4 11 84 
Tax credit R&D 0 0 1 99 
Tax deduction 80% patent income 0 1 3 96 
Note:  The second up to the fifth column show the share of the first up to the fourth quartile in total R&D expenditures or the total amount 
of subsidies or tax benefits received by firms in 2015. The first (fourth) quartile groups the quarter of the firms with the lowest 
(highest) R&D expenditures or amount pf public support received.    
Table 3 shows the evolution, between 2008 and 2015, of the concentration of R&D expenditures and 
public support in the top 25% (fourth quartile). Regional subsidies appear to have become a bit more 
skewed towards the top 25%, with the share of the fourth quartile rising from 71% in 2008 to 77% in 
2015. However, except for the partial exemption for Young Innovative Companies, regional subsidies 
are still less skewed than the tax benefits. The tax credit and the tax deduction for 80% of patent income 
are highly skewed, even more so than R&D expenditures. Despite the increasing number of firms that 
benefit from the R&D tax credit, this tax incentive has become even more skewed over time, with the 
share of the fourth quartile rising from 92% to 99% in 2015. 
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Table 3  Evolution of the fourth quartile in R&D expenditures and public support for R&D (2008-2015) 
In % 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
R&D expenditures 95 95 96 95 95 95 95 94 
Regional subsidy 71 68 68 74 76 79 79 77 
Research cooperation 87 87 86 85 85 81 80 81 
Young Innovative Company 69 69 72 72 72 71 69 68 
PhDs and civil engineers 86 87 88 88 89 89 89 89 
Master 86 87 86 84 85 85 84 84 
Tax credit R&D 92 89 95 95 97 96 99 99 
Tax deduction 80% patent income 96 99 97 96 97 98 98 96 
Note:  The table shows the evolution, from 2008 to 2015, of the share of the fourth quartile in total R&D expenditures and the share of the 
fourth quartile in the total amount of subsidies or tax benefits received by firms.  
The use of the support schemes differs across industries. This is shown in table 4 which provides the 
top ten industries in terms of their share (in %) in total R&D expenditures and the total amount of sup-
port provided for each individual support scheme. The share in public support denotes the share in the 
sum of support received by firms that reported R&D expenditures in the 2016 R&D survey and therefore 
not the share in total support for that specific scheme. The two-digit NACE code of industries is shown 
in brackets (a list of all two-digit codes with a full description is provided in Annex 1).  
Table 4  The ten industries with the highest share in total R&D expenditures and public support for R&D (2015) 
In % (two-digit NACE code in brackets) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
R&D expenditures 20.9 
(21) 
11.2 
(72) 
8.5 
(62) 
6.6 
(46) 
5.9 
(20) 
5.8 
(70) 
5.1 
(71) 
4.3 
(26) 
4.0 
(28) 
3.1 
(77) 
Regional subsidy 14.8 
(62) 
14.2 
(72) 
8.4 
(26) 
7.3 
(71) 
6.9 
(28) 
6.7 
(21) 
6.3 
(46) 
5.5 
(70) 
3.3 
(38) 
3.0 
(20) 
Research cooperation 16.4 
(30) 
14.2 
(70) 
11.7 
(62) 
11.6 
(72) 
9.1 
(71) 
7.0 
(20) 
6.4 
(77) 
5.4 
46) 
4.3 
(24) 
2.3 
(26) 
Young Innovative  
Company 
37.2 
(62) 
13.6 
(71) 
12.8 
(72) 
11.0 
(26) 
3.2 
(73) 
3.1 
(70) 
2.7 
(30) 
1.8 
(69) 
1.8 
(46) 
1.7 
(58) 
PhDs and civil engineers 25.0 
(21) 
11.0 
(72) 
9.8 
(62) 
7.8 
(70) 
7.3 
(20) 
5.5 
(46) 
4.7 
(77) 
4.6 
(26) 
4.6 
(71) 
3.5 
(28) 
Master 9.7 
(72) 
9.6 
(62) 
9.0 
(71) 
8.1 
(46) 
7.3 
(45) 
7.1 
(26) 
6.3 
(21) 
5.1 
(70) 
4.9 
(28) 
4.3 
(20) 
Tax credit R&D 46.5 
(21) 
22.6 
(77) 
7.2
(72) 
5.4
(62) 
5.0
(46) 
3.9
(20) 
3.4
(26) 
1.4 
(24) 
1.4 
(71) 
0.9
(23) 
Tax deduction 80% patent 
income 
67.4 
(21) 
9.7 
(28) 
6.6
(30) 
2.1
(72) 
1.8 
(26) 
1.7
(10) 
1.4
(29) 
1.3 
(71) 
1.2 
(46) 
1.0
(27) 
Note:  The table shows the share, in 2015, in total R&D expenditures and the amount of support received for each individual support scheme, 
for industries ranked from first (1) to tenth (10). Shares are denoted in % and the two-digit NACE code is provided in brackets. A 
description of all industries by two-digit NACE code is provided in Annex 1. The shares in public support denote the share in the sum 
of support of firms that reported R&D expenditures in the 2016 R&D Survey.   
The three industries with the highest share in R&D expenditures, Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical 
products and pharmaceutical preparations (21), Scientific research and development (72) and Computer 
programming, consultancy and related activities (62) unsurprisingly also have high shares in public 
support. Scientific research and development and Computer programming, consultancy and related 
activities have a relatively high share in direct support (regional subsidies) whereas firms in Manufac-
ture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations clearly are by far the main 
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beneficiaries of the R&D tax credit and even more so of the tax deduction of 80% of patent income, with 
a share of 67.4%.13 The partial exemption for Young Innovative Companies is mainly used by market 
service industries such as Computer programming, consultancy and related activities (62), Architectural 
and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis (71) and Scientific research and develop-
ment (72). With a share in total R&D expenditures of 2.4% (ranked 11th), Manufacture of other transport 
equipment (30) is the industry with the highest share in the partial exemption of the withholding tax 
for research cooperation and holds the third position for the tax deduction of 80% of patent income. 
Rental and leasing activities (77), with a share of 3.1% in total R&D expenditures has a share of 22.6% 
of support provided through the R&D tax credit.   
For the evaluation of the efficiency of R&D tax incentives, data on the R&D expenditures of firms is 
required. In the R&D Policy Mix database this information is provided through the R&D surveys which 
are carried out every even year. Based on the information from the survey carried out in 2016, table 5 
shows to what extent the amount of public support for R&D received by firms in 2015 can be matched 
with information on their R&D expenditures. For about half of the firms that received a subsidy or a tax 
benefit in 2015, information on R&D expenditures is available, except for the tax credit and the tax de-
duction of 80% of patent income for which this share is much lower.  
Table 5  Responses of firms with public support as to R&D expenditures in 2015 (2016 R&D Survey) 
 Performed R&D Did not perform R&D  No response Not in list R&D firms 
Regional subsidy 484 (44%) [66%] 78 (7%) 336 (31%) 196 (18%) 
Research cooperation 110 (51%) [71%] 13 (6%) 72 (33%) 21 (10%) 
Young Innovative Company 160 (49%) [49%] 8 (2%) 101 (31%) 57 (17%) 
PhDs and civil engineers 480 (52%) [70%] 34 (4%) 307 (33%) 101 (11%) 
Master 801 (49%) [63%] 84 (5%) 567 (35%) 189 (12%) 
Tax credit R&D 162 (50%) [84%] 11 (3%) 76 (24%) 73 (23%) 
Tax deduction 80% patent income 147 (37%) [65%] 16 (4%) 98 (25%) 137 (34%) 
Note:  The table shows the response in the 2016 R&D Survey, of firms that received public support for R&D in 2015, on the question whether 
they performed R&D in 2015 (second column) or not (third column). The fourth column shows the number of firms that received 
support but did not respond to the survey and the final column shows the number of firms that are not included in the list of firms to 
which the R&D survey is sent. The numbers in round brackets denote the share of each of the four groups in the total number of firms 
that received support through that specific scheme. The numbers in square brackets, in the second column, denote the share of firms 
that reported to have perform R&D in 2015, in the total amount of support for that specific scheme.   
The firms which received support and reported R&D expenditures in 2015 account for a disproportion-
ate share in the total amount of public support as can be seen by comparing the numbers in square 
brackets to the number in round brackets in the second column of table 5. As only those firms that report 
R&D expenditures are considered for estimation the numbers show that for each scheme, except for the 
partial exemption for Young Innovative Companies, firms that account for 63% of support, or more, are 
included in the estimations.  
Some firms, though relatively few, that received tax incentives in support of R&D in 2015 responded 
not to have had any R&D expenditures in that year. A larger share of firms with support did not respond 
to the 2016 R&D survey. Finally, for each support scheme there are some firms that do not appear on 
                                                          
13  As pointed out before the share denotes the share in support received by firms that reported R&D expenditures in the 2016 
R&D Survey and therefore not the share in the sum of support received by all firms, respective of their response to the R&D 
survey.  
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the list of firms to which the R&D survey is sent. Especially for the tax credit and the tax deduction of 
80% of patent income the share of these firms is relatively high.  
Table 6 considers firms that did respond to the R&D survey and reported R&D expenditures for a given 
year, over the period 2008-2015, and shows the share of these R&D active firms that benefitted from 
support in the same year. The share of R&D active firms that benefit from the partial exemption for 
R&D employees with a master’s degree increased from 13% to 36%.  
Table 6  Evolution in the share of R&D active firms that receive public support  
In % 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Regional subsidy 18 19 16 22 17 18 20 22 
Research cooperation 7 6 7 7 4 5 5 5 
Young Innovative Company 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 
PhDs and civil engineers 18 21 22 20 20 22 19 21 
Master 13 17 22 24 25 30 29 36 
Tax credit R&D 2 3 3 4 4 5 6 6 
Tax deduction 80% patent income 2 2 4 4 4 5 5 7 
Note:  The table shows the share of firms that report R&D expenditures in the R&D survey, that received support for R&D through one of the 
schemes. Due to some corrections in the data on regional subsidies the share for 2011 is slightly smaller than that reported in the 
report of the second evaluation (Dumont 2015: Table 4 on page 18). 
In relative terms, there was also a strong increase in the share of R&D active firms that benefit from a 
tax credit or a tax deduction of 80% of patent income. The most surprising takeaway from table 6, how-
ever, is that even in 2015 only a minority of R&D active firms use the tax benefits in support of R&D 
that were introduced between 2005 and 2008.14  In 2015, 52% of R&D active firms used at least one of 
the available R&D tax incentives, up from 29% in 2008.  
The use of public support, subsidies as well as tax benefits, clearly increases with the level of R&D 
expenditures. Table 7 shows the share of firms within each of the four quartiles of R&D expenditures 
– first quartile being the bottom 25% of R&D active firms and the fourth quartile the top 25% of R&D 
active firms – that used a given support scheme in 2015.  
Of the top 25% of R&D active firms in 2015, 61% benefitted from the partial exemption of the withhold-
ing tax for R&D employees with a master’s degree. This still implies that 39% of the firms with the 
highest R&D expenditures do not use this support scheme. For the other schemes the shares of the 
fourth R&D quartile are even lower.      
 
                                                          
14  In 2012, the last year with information on this support scheme, 5.76% of R&D active firms benefitted from the tax deduction 
for R&D investment. 
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Table 7  Share of R&D active firms that receive public support by quartile of R&D expenditures in 2015  
In % 
 First R&D quartile
Second R&D 
quartile
Third R&D  
quartile 
Fourth R&D 
quartile
Regional subsidy 7 18 24 27 
Research cooperation 2 3 5 8 
Young Innovative Company 2 6 9 8 
PhDs and civil engineers 5 6 17 44 
Master 10 23 33 61 
Tax credit R&D 1 3 7 18 
Tax deduction 80% patent income 2 4 5 12 
Note:  The table shows the share of firms that report R&D expenditures for 2015, in the 2016 R&D survey, that received support for R&D 
through one of the schemes, for each of the four quartiles of R&D expenditures. (First quartile: bottom 25% R&D active firms up to 
forth quartile: top 25% of R&D active firms). As the quartiles are not evenly distributed, the unweighted average over the four quartiles 
does not necessarily equal the share for 2015 reported in the last column of table 6.   
The extent to which firms combine different schemes of public support for R&D is shown in table 8.  
Of firms that received direct support in 2015, through regional subsidies, 34% only received direct sup-
port and did not use any tax incentive. One percent of the firms with direct support in 2015 combined 
this with the partial exemption for research cooperation, for Young Innovative Companies and two 
percent for R&D employees with a PhD or civil engineering degree, respectively but not with another 
tax incentive.  
Table 8  Policy mix: combinations of public support for R&D in 2015 
In % 
 Regional
subsidy 
Research
coopera-
tion 
YIC PhDs
and civil 
engi-
neers 
Master Tax 
credit 
R&D 
Tax 
deduction 
80%  
patent  
income
Single use 34 33 34 18 36 7 18 
Combined with one other instrument:        
Subsidy  5 4 2 4 9 13 
Research cooperation 1  0 0 0 1 1 
Young Innovative Company 1 0  0 1 2 2 
PhDs and civil engineers 2 1 1  5 2 2 
Master 7 0 4 8  5 15 
Tax credit R&D 0 0 1 0 0  0 
Tax deduction 80% patent income 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Combined with more than one support 
scheme 54 61 56 70 54 74 50 
Note:  The table shows the share of firms that received, in 2015, only one of the given forms of public support (single use), combine it with 
one of the other benefits (second up to seventh line) or combine it with at least two other benefits (last line).  
Of firms that received subsidies in 2015, 7% combined this direct support with the partial exemption for 
R&D employees with a master’s degree but no other tax incentive. Finally, 54% combined direct support 
with at least two tax incentives. For firms that benefitted from a R&D tax incentive in 2015, the share 
that combined this incentive with at least two other support schemes is even more substantial. For ex-
ample, of firms that used the partial exemption for R&D employees with a PhD or civil engineer degree 
in 2015, 70% combined this tax incentive with at least two other support schemes. For firms that used 
the tax credit for R&D investment, 74% combined this with at least two other support schemes. The fact 
that firms tend to combine different schemes of public support to R&D needs to be acknowledged in 
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the estimation of the extent to which individual support schemes succeed in stimulating additional R&D 
activities.   
Table 9 reports the average and median of some firm characteristics for firms that use a given support 
scheme and firms that did not receive any support for R&D in 2015.  
Firms that benefit from specific support schemes appear to be distinct in terms of some variables. Firms 
that use tax incentives have, on average, a much higher level of R&D expenditures and R&D intensity. 
They are generally also larger and older than firms that do not receive support or that receive direct 
support (subsidies). 
Table 9  Descriptive statistics by support scheme (2015)  
 
No support Subsidy 
Exemption  
R&D cooperation 
Exemption 
 YIC
 Average Median Average Median Average Median Average Median 
R&D expenditures 191 14 2760 112 8533 250 594 152 
R&D/value added 6 0 29 8 36 12 37 21 
Total public support 0 0 838 76 3419 75 168 45 
Number of employees 107 26 225 44 322 59 62 44 
Firm age 27 25 23 19 26 20 7 5 
Capital/employee 85 30 71 35 52 31 92 50 
Net profitability 20 14 18 13 18 10 27 23 
Financial independence 36 35 40 39 38 36 36 40 
Long term debt rate 20 14 20 14 21 17 22 15 
 Exemption PhDs  
and civil engineers
Exemption  
Master’s degree
Tax credit  
R&D investment 
Tax deduction  
80% patent income
 Average Median Average Median Average Median Average Median 
R&D expenditures 5217 552 2737 278 8991 821 9243 465 
R&D/value added 27 10 22 6 22 4 5 2 
Total public support 1787 128 768 76 4716 239 3134 134 
Number of employees 350 95 250 80 861 180 514 72 
Firm age 30 26 28 25 23 13 29 26 
Capital/employee 121 31 74 31 73 36 53 32 
Net profitability 17 14 18 13 -7 5 31 23 
Financial independence 44 42 41 40 42 19 46 45 
Long term debt rate 20 13 19 11 22 17 16 11 
Note:  R&D expenditures, total public support and capital per employee are denoted in 1000 euro. All other variables are expressed in % 
except number of employees and firm age.  
Except for Young Innovative Companies and firms that benefit from the tax deduction of 80% of patent 
income, firms with public support for R&D are however not more profitable, on average, than firms 
that do not receive any support. They generally have a higher financial independence. The difference in 
long-term debt rate is not large except for firms that use the tax deduction of 80% of patent income, 
which on average have a lower debt rate. The group of firms that benefit from the R&D tax credit stands 
out from the rest in terms of low profitability and a large difference between the average and median of 
R&D expenditures and total public support.        
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Firms using the patent box appear to have the highest financial independence, which could be explained 
by the combination of the notional interest deduction and the tax deduction for patent income.15    
                                                          
15  The combination of the two provisions allows companies to exempt, from taxable profits eligible to the tax deduction for 
patent income, up to five times the rate of the notional interest deduction. The notional interest is a fictitious interest calculated 
on the equity (net assets) of a company. The deduction aims at reducing tax discrimination between debt financing and equity 
financing and thereby stimulates a higher share of assets on the balance sheet of companies. 
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4. Estimation methodology 
The tax incentives that were introduced between 2005 and 2007 aim at raising investment in R&D in 
Belgium. This can be achieved by encouraging R&D active firms to consider additional R&D activities 
(the intensive margin of R&D) or to spur firms that are not active in R&D to start doing R&D (the ex-
tensive margin of R&D).16  
The baseline specification used in this paper to estimate the impact of tax incentives on business R&D 
is a regression of R&D expenditures on the amount of support received by firms through the different 
schemes of public support: 
𝑙𝑛ሺ𝑅𝐷௜௧ሻ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛽௥௘௚ 𝑙𝑛൫𝑋௜௧௥௘௚൯ + 𝛽௖௢௢௣ 𝑙𝑛൫𝑋௜௧௖௢௢௣൯ + 𝛽௒ூ஼ 𝑙𝑛ሺ𝑋௜௧௒ூ஼ሻ + 𝛽௉௛஽ 𝑙𝑛ሺ𝑋௜௧௉௛஽ሻ +
𝛽ெ௔௦௧௘௥ 𝑙𝑛ሺ𝑋௜௧ெ௔௦௧௘௥ሻ + 𝛽஼௥௘ௗ௜௧ 𝑙𝑛൫𝑋௜௧஼௥௘ௗ௜௧൯ + 𝛽௉௔௧௘௡௧ 𝑙𝑛ሺ𝑋௜௧௉௔௧௘௡௧ሻ +  𝜀௜௧                                   (1) 
Dependent variable: 
itRD : internal R&D expenditures (excluding the total amount of public support) of company i in year t 
Explanatory variables (public support for R&D): 
reg
itX : total amount of regional subsidies received 
coop
itX : total amount saved through partial exemption of the withholding tax on the wages  
of researchers cooperating with a university, college or a scientific institution 
YIC
itX :  total amount saved through partial exemption of the withholding tax on the wages  
of R&D personnel in Young Innovative Companies (YIC) 
PhD
itX :  total amount saved through partial exemption of the withholding tax on the wages  
of researchers with a PhD degree in exact or applied sciences, doctor degree in (veterinary) 
medicine or a civil engineering degree  
Master
itX : total amount saved through partial exemption of the withholding tax on the wages  
of researchers with a master’s degree (excluding social or human sciences)  
Credit
itX  :  total amount saved through the tax credit for R&D investment  
Patent
itX : total amount saved through the tax deduction of 80% of qualifying gross patent income 
                                                          
16  The R&D intensity of a country, R&D expenditures relative to GDP, can increase because R&D active firms increase their 
R&D intensity, because firms without R&D activities start doing R&D but also through reallocation, for example when R&D 
active companies increase their share in total value added relative to firms without R&D activities.     
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εit:  error term (assumed to be randomly distributed with an expected value of 0 and a constant vari-
ance)17   
Given the highly skewed distribution of R&D expenditures and public support (as shown in table 2 and 
3) all variables are considered in logarithm, increasing the likelihood of the assumption that errors εit 
are normally distributed. The dependent variable in the baseline specification is total R&D expenditures 
reported by a company minus the total amount of public support for R&D received by the company, 
following David, Hall and Toole (2000), Clausen (2008), Cerulli (2010) and Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014). 
Only real responses of firms in the R&D survey as to their R&D expenditures are considered and only 
firms with non-zero R&D expenditures are included in estimations. Estimation of the impact of public 
support therefore relies on the fact that not all R&D active firms receive public support, as well as on 
variation in the amount of direct or tax support received by firms with R&D activities.      
Although the focus of this evaluation is on federal tax incentives, the total amount of direct support for 
R&D received by firms is also included in the econometric specification. In Belgium, regional agencies 
provide substantial direct support, mainly through subsidies, for R&D and innovation activities of com-
panies. An unbiased estimation of the efficiency of tax incentives therefore requires the inclusion of the 
direct support received by firms. The inclusion of the total amount of direct support arguably gives short 
shrift to the policy mix of regional agencies as it does not account for the diversity of the regional subsidy 
programmes and differences between the three regions. The direct support variable should be seen more 
as a control variable in the estimation of the efficiency of the federal tax incentives than as a variable re-
flecting the efficiency of regional subsidies, which is beyond the scope of this evaluation.   
The estimation includes control variables that denote characteristics that may affect the R&D investment 
decisions of firms such as value added, the number of employees, firm age and capital intensity. In 
addition, region, industry and year dummies are included. Time-varying industry-specific characteris-
tics are considered by including industry-year dummies, following Aghion et al. (2012) and Einiö 
(2014).18  
The assessment of the efficiency of public support is complicated by the fact that firms decide autono-
mously how much they invest in R&D but also whether to apply for direct or indirect support. Firm-
level subsidies are awarded through competitive procedures, based on the assessment of project pro-
posals, by regional agencies. The granting of subsidies is subject to selection by agencies and self-selec-
tion by companies. Although all R&D active firms are eligible to benefit from most tax incentives in 
Belgium19, only a minority of R&D active firms appears to apply for indirect support, as shown in ta-
ble 6. This indicates that there is also self-selection in the application for tax incentives. If the selection 
by agencies that award subsidies and the autonomy of firms to decide how much to invest in R&D and 
whether to apply for tax incentives, are not accounted for, estimates of the impact of public support to 
business R&D are likely to be biased. Different estimation procedures exist to address the selection bias 
                                                          
17  A traditional regression (Ordinary Least Squares, OLS) will only provide unbiased estimates if the assumptions regarding the 
error term (sometimes labelled as disturbance or residual term) hold. With real observational data, the strong assumptions 
(e.g., homoscedasticity and no serial correlation) are often violated. Procedures that relax the assumptions need to be consid-
ered to account for the possible bias in the estimates. 
18  It is not possible to include all dummies in all estimations, due to multicollinearity. 
19  There is an obvious age condition (see footnote 1 on page 10) for the partial exemption for Young Innovative Companies.   
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and endogeneity in the assessment of the impact of public support. As pointed out by European Com-
mission (2014) it is necessary to acknowledge that all methods have limitations and are only valid if 
certain assumptions hold. As in the previous evaluation, the estimation strategy adopted in this paper 
is to start from a panel (fixed effects) estimation, which accounts for unobserved time-invariant firm 
heterogeneity, and to compare these results with the estimates from other procedures to assess whether 
robust conclusions can be obtained (in line with the recommendations by European Commission 2014 
and Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014). In addition to the results from fixed effects panel estimation, the next 
chapter reports the results of a selection model, instrumental variables and dynamic panel estimation. 
Details of the advantage and limitations of these different estimation procedures can be found in 
Dumont (2015). 
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5. Results 
This chapter reports the results of panel (fixed effects) estimation of the impact of the federal tax incen-
tives on R&D expenditures of companies. These results are compared to estimates from other proce-
dures that address the issue of selection and endogeneity that complicates the estimation of the causal 
impact of public support to business R&D. Section 5.1 considers the input additionality of public sup-
port, in effect, the extent to which support raises R&D expenditures of companies. In section 5.2 results 
are reported on behavioural additionality, for example the impact of public support on the orientation 
of R&D activities (share of basic and applied research and experimental development). Section 5.3 con-
siders the potential impact of support on output (productivity, profitability and patents).      
5.1. Input additionality  
5.1.1. Baseline estimation: fixed effects 
Table 10 reports the results of fixed effects estimation of specification (1), as shown in chapter 4. A fixed 
effects estimation is an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation in which firm-specific dummies are 
included that are constant over time.20 In the context of public support to business R&D, fixed effects 
capture unobserved firm characteristics that influence the firm’s R&D activities and its demand for pub-
lic support, such as R&D experience, experience with the application for public support and firm-spe-
cific technological capabilities and opportunities (Lichtenberg 1984, Henningsen et al. 2015).  
Specification (1) on p.27 considers all variables in logs. A logarithmic transformation increases the like-
lihood of the assumption that errors are normally distributed. However, in order to keep all observa-
tions for which the amount of support received by firms is zero21, ln(x+1) is considered instead of ln(x) 
so that the logarithm is also defined for zero values, following Lehto (2007). This transformation may 
however provide biased estimates, for example, due to heteroskedasticity as pointed out by Santos Silva 
and Tenreyro (2006). An alternative that permits to keep zero-valued observations is the Inverse Hy-
perbolic Sine (IHS) transformation: ln (x + √𝑥ଶ + 1 ). Bellemare and Wichman (2018) discuss the inter-
pretation of the coefficients from estimations with IHS transformation, which are not elasticities as is 
the case in a log-log specification although for large positive values, the IHS transformation can be 
treated like a natural logarithm transformation. The last column in table 10 reports the results of a fixed 
effects estimation in which variables have been IHS-transformed rather than through ln(x+1) as for the 
estimates reported in the other columns.22       
                                                          
20  A fixed effects estimator is often called a within estimator as fixed effects estimates can also be obtained by OLS on variables 
after within transformation (subtracting, from each variable (dependent and independent), the average for each firm). A ro-
bust Hausman test (RHAUSMAN Stata procedure) clearly rejects the null hypothesis of random effects. The results of a ran-
dom effects estimation are therefore not reported.  
21  Given that only a minority of R&D active firms benefit from subsidies or tax incentives, the variables denoting the amount of 
support received by firms each year are predominantly zero.   
22  IHS transformation permits to include negative values. Observations for which net R&D expenditures are negative, in effect 
those firms for which total public support received appears to exceed reported R&D expenditures, are not included in the HIS 
estimation.  
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Table 10  Results of fixed effects panel estimation (2003-2015) 
 Log 1 Log 2 IHS 
Dependent variable (R&D expenditures net of public support)
Explanatory variables (public support): 
Regional subsidy 0.09 (7.90) *** 0.09 (7.69) *** 0.09 (8.02) *** 
Research cooperation 0.12 (4.58) *** 0.12 (4.34) *** 0.12 (4.58) *** 
Young Innovative Company 0.12 (3.25) *** 0.14 (3.38) *** 0.12 (3.27) *** 
PhDs and civil engineers 0.08 (4.76) *** 0.08 (4.44) *** 0.08 (4.78) *** 
Master 0.14 (8.67) *** 0.14 (8.43) *** 0.14 (8.71) *** 
Tax credit R&D 0.01 (0.24) 0.02 (0.71)  0.01 (0.27)  
Tax deduction 80% patent income -0.02 (-1.14)  -0.02 (-1.03)  -0.02 (-1.07) 
Control variables:    
Value added 0.09 (1.03)  0.07 (0.79)  0.09 (1.00)  
Number of employees 1.57 (8.57) *** 1.58 (8.39) *** 1.64 (8.48) *** 
Age -1.54 (-3.95) *** -1.47 (-3.63) *** -1.64 (-3.98) *** 
Capital intensity 0.30 (3.17) *** 0.32 (3.41) *** 0.31 (3.14) *** 
Industry (two-digit NACE)  Yes No Yes 
Year dummies Yes No Yes 
Industry - year dummies No Yes No 
R-squared (within) 0.06 0.12 0.06 
Number of observations 16,280 16,280 16,280 
Note:  The table shows the results of fixed effects estimation of specification (1) on p.27. All variables are considered in logs. Region dummies 
are dropped due to multicollinearity. IHS: Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (see text). *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs 
from zero at a statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroske-
dasticity.  
The second column in table 10 shows the results of a fixed effects estimation with two-digit industry 
dummies and year dummies. The results of a fixed effects estimation with industry-year dummies are 
shown in the third column. The results of the three alternative panel estimations are very similar, in 
terms of the coefficient estimates as well as statistical significance. Considering industry-year dummies, 
instead of industry and year dummies, substantially increases explained variance with an R-squared of 
0.12 compared to 0.6 for the estimations that include industry and year dummies. This indicates the 
important role of industry-year specific explanations of R&D activities. For all three alternative estima-
tions, the coefficients of regional subsidies and the four schemes of partial exemption of the withholding 
tax are positive and statistically significant. The coefficient of the R&D tax credit is positive in all three 
estimations but very low and moreover not statistically significant.23 The coefficient of the tax deduction 
of 80% of patent income is negative but not statistically significant in any of the three estimations.  
Large and capital-intensive firms tend to spend more on R&D whereas the impact of firm age is nega-
tive.  
Annex 2 compares the results of an estimation in which all support schemes are jointly considered in 
one estimation (as reported in table 10) to the results of estimations in which each scheme is considered 
separately, without accounting for support received through other schemes. Ignoring support received 
through other schemes clearly results in overestimation of the efficiency of individual support schemes.    
                                                          
23  Greenland et al. (2016) discuss the actual meaning and common misinterpretation of statistical significance.    
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A panel estimation with net profitability, financial independence and the long-term-debt rate as addi-
tional control variables provides similar results but given many missing observations for these variables 
the number of observations drops considerably to 9,146. None of the three additional control variables 
is statistically significant. An estimation that allows for first-order autocorrelation provides similar re-
sults as in table 10. The results of these additional estimations are not reported but available upon re-
quest.   
Table 11 shows the results of a fixed effects panel estimation in which the tax deduction for R&D invest-
ment and the amount of the innovation premium paid to employees is included in addition to the other 
support schemes (see section 3.1 for more details). For the tax deduction, the R&D Policy Mix database 
only contains information up to 2012. The total amount of the innovation premium is limited. The coef-
ficient of the tax deduction for R&D is statistically significant and positive in all three specifications. The 
coefficient of the innovation premium is not statistically significant.   
Table 11 Results of fixed effects panel estimation with additional variables for public support (2003-2015) 
 Log 1 Log 2 IHS 
Dependent variable (R&D expenditures net of public support)
Explanatory variables (public support): 
Regional subsidy 0.09 (6.88) *** 0.09 (6.93) *** 0.09 (7.28) *** 
Research cooperation 0.11 (4.52) *** 0.11 (4.47) *** 0.11 (4.39) *** 
Young Innovative Company 0.12 (2.69) *** 0.13 (2.96) *** 0.11 (2.49) ** 
PhDs and civil engineers 0.08 (4.70) *** 0.07 (4.52) *** 0.07 (4.18) *** 
Master 0.14 (9.29) *** 0.14 (9.27) *** 0.14 (9.95) *** 
Tax credit R&D 0.01 (0.55) 0.02 (0.91) 0.01 (0.56) 
Tax deduction 80% patent income -0.02 (-0.75) -0.02 (-0.66) -0.01 (-0.57) 
Tax deduction R&D (available up to 2012) 0.09 (3.44) *** 0.08 (3.04) *** 0.07 (2.76) *** 
Innovation premium 0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (-0.06) -0.01 (-0.38) 
Control variables:     
Value added 0.09 (1.20) 0.06 (0.85) -0.08 (-1.37) 
Number of employees 1.56 (12.94) *** 1.57 (12.90) *** 1.73 (13.66) *** 
Age -1.56 (-5.95) *** -1.49 (-5.60) *** -1.47 (-6.29) *** 
Capital intensity 0.30 (4.72) *** 0.32 (5.03) *** 0.29 (4.43) *** 
Industry (two-digit NACE)  Yes No Yes 
Year dummies Yes No Yes 
Industry - year dummies No Yes No 
R-squared (within) 0.06 0.12 0.06 
Number of observations 16,266 16,266 16,266 
Note:  The table shows the results of a fixed effects estimation of specification (1) with two additional support schemes compared to table 
10: the tax deduction for R&D investment, for which data are only available until 2012, and the innovation premium. All variables are 
considered in logs. IHS: Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (see text). *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs from zero at a 
statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
All variables used in the estimation that are expressed in euro are deflated using official Belgian defla-
tors. Estimation with alternative OECD deflators, not reported, provides similar results. All estimations 
that are further reported in this paper use the official Belgian deflators.  
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Estimations with total R&D expenditures (internal and external) provides similar results. When external 
R&D expenditures are considered, only the coefficients of regional subsidies and the partial exemption 
for research cooperation are positive and statistically significant.  
The impact of public support on R&D expenditures may differ according to the level of support. To 
provide an indication of the potential non-linear impact of support, graph 6 up to graph 12 show esti-
mates of the elasticity by decile24 of the level of support, for regional subsidies and the different tax 
incentives. The first decile shows the elasticity at the 10% lowest level of support provided and the ninth 
decile the elasticity at the 10% highest level of support. The two dashed lines in each graph show the 
95% confidence interval for the coefficient (elasticity) estimate. For the elasticity to be positive and sta-
tistically significant, the lower bound of the confidence interval should be positive or at least not far 
below zero.  
Although the estimate of elasticity is not linked in a linear way with the absolute amount of support 
received by firms, for most support schemes the estimate tends to decline with the level of support and 
the lowest estimates are found at the higher deciles. This is especially the case for regional subsidies and 
to a lesser extent for the four schemes of partial exemption from payment of the withholding tax on the 
wages of R&D employees.  
For the R&D tax credit the elasticity is lower for the first two deciles and reaches a maximum at the third 
and fourth decile. However, in line with the results reported in table 10, the coefficient is always close 
to zero and not statistically significant at any decile. Equally in line with the results in table 10, the 
coefficient of tax deduction of 80% of patent income is negative except at the ninth decile and not statis-
tically significant at any decile.        
 
                                                          
24 A decile is any of the nine values that divide firms, ranked according to a given criterion, into ten equal parts. 
Graph 6  Elasticity by decile of regional subsidies  
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Graph 7  Elasticity by decile of partial exemption of the withholding tax for research cooperation  
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Graph 8  Elasticity by decile of partial exemption for Young Innovative Companies  
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Graph 9  Elasticity by decile of partial exemption for PhDs and civil engineers  
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Graph 10  Elasticity by decile of partial exemption for R&D employees with a master’s degree  
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The efficiency of public support is sometimes evaluated by considering the impact on R&D intensity 
rather than on the level of R&D expenditures. As the tax incentives introduced by the federal govern-
ment aim at increasing R&D intensity (R&D expenditures in % of GDP) in Belgium, this may indeed 
seem the appropriate target.  However, firms appear to aim at constant R&D intensity (see, for example, 
Cohen and Klepper 1996, Symeonidis 1996, Klette and Kortum 2004, Coad and Rao 2010) and as such 
R&D intensity may not be an appropriate target variable in firm-level estimations. Table 12 reports the 
Graph 11  Elasticity by decile of the R&D tax credit 
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Graph 12  Elasticity by decile of the tax deduction of 80% of patent income  
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results of fixed effects estimation in which four alternative dependent variables are considered: R&D 
intensity (R&D expenditures relative to value added), R&D expenditures per employee, the number of 
researchers and finally researchers as a share of total personnel.25 
The results in table 12 are to a large extent in line with those reported in table 10, with some notable 
exceptions. For R&D intensity denoted as the ratio of R&D expenditures to value added26 and for R&D 
expenditures per employee the sign is negative and statistically significant for regional subsidies. For 
the two other dependent variables the sign of regional subsidies is positive and statistically significant. 
The coefficient of the partial exemption of the withholding tax for R&D employees with a PhD or civil 
engineering degree is positive and statistically significant for three out of four estimations. 
Table 12  Results of fixed effects panel estimation with alternative dependent variables (2003-2015) 
Dependent variable: 
𝑅&𝐷 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑  
𝑅&𝐷 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 
Number of researchers 
(FTE)
𝑅&𝐷 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 
Explanatory variables:   
Regional subsidy -0.02 (-4.40) *** -0.02 (5.46) *** 0.01 (5.84) *** 0.01 (4.97) *** 
Research cooperation 0.01 (0.85) 0.01 (1.58)  0.01 (1.77) * 0.01 (1.68) *  
Young Innovative 
Company 0.01 (0.65)  -0.01 (-0.74) 0.02 (2.21) ** 0.01 (1.10) 
PhDs and civil  
engineers 0.01 (2.87) *** 0.00 (0.82) 0.01 (2.45) ** 0.01 (1.85) * 
Master 0.01 (1.36) 0.00 (1.16) 0.01 (3.33) *** 0.01 (3.06) *** 
Tax credit R&D 0.00 (0.19) 0.00 (0.05) 0.00 (0.86) 0.01 (1.53) 
Tax deduction 80% 
patent income -0.01 (-1.42)  -0.01 (-0.91) -0.00 (-0.70) -0.01 (-1.38) 
Control variables:     
Value added  -0.00 (-0.52) 0.02 (1.33) -0.01 (-0.93) 
Number of employees 0.32 (5.64) ***  0.53 (11.14) ***  
Age -0.19 (-1.90) * -0.28 (-3.28) *** -0.03 (-0.42) -0.25 (-3.87) *** 
Capital intensity 0.05 (1.91) * 0.11 (3.95) *** 0.03 (1.80) * 0.06 (3.19) *** 
R-squared (within) 0.34 0.09 0.18 0.12 
Number of observations 13,003 13,003 13,326 13,326 
Note:  The table shows the results of fixed effects (within) panel estimation using alternative dependent variables. All variables are consid-
ered in logs except the dependent variable in the last estimation (column). As this variable is bounded between 0 and 1, a logistic 
transformation has been applied. Industry-year dummies are included in all estimations. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient 
estimate differs from zero at a statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust 
to heteroskedasticity. 
Equally in line with the results in table 10, the coefficient of the R&D tax credit is not statistically signif-
icant in any of the four estimations and the impact of the tax deduction of 80% of patent income is 
negative but not statistically significant.   
Goolsbee (1998) argued that part of the increase in R&D expenditures due to public support may be 
explained by an increase in the wages of researchers, if the supply of high-skilled workers is inelastic. 
His estimates for the U.S. suggest that estimates of the efficiency of R&D policy may be overestimated 
by 30 to 50% due to higher wages for researchers. Lokshin and Mohnen (2013) provide more recent 
evidence of an impact of public support on the wages of researchers in the Netherlands. Dumont, 
                                                          
25  Lichtenberg (1984) argues that R&D employment may provide a better indicator of real R&D input than inaccurately deflated 
R&D expenditures. 
26  Using R&D expenditures relative to sales to denote R&D intensity provides similar results but as sales is not available for 
many small firms, the number of observations drops to 8,896. Results are available upon request. 
WORKING PAPER 4-19 
39 
Spithoven and Teirlinck (2016) show that accounting for changes in the composition of R&D personnel 
reduces the estimates of the impact of public support on the wages of researchers. Table 13 shows the 
results of fixed effects estimation in which the average wage of R&D employees is considered as the 
dependent variable. In the last column, the share of three educational categories of R&D employees are 
included in the estimation. The partial exemption for PhDs and civil engineers appears to have a statis-
tically significant positive impact on the average wage of R&D employees but this result is not robust 
to inclusion of the share of PhDs in R&D employment.  
Table 13  Results of panel estimation of the impact of public support on the average wage of R&D employees (2003-
2015) 
Dependent variable: average wage R&D employees   
Explanatory variables:  
Regional subsidy 0.00 (1.14) 0.01 (1.80) 
Research cooperation 0.01 (1.20) 0.01 (1.18) 
Young Innovative Company -0.00 (-0.05) -0.00 (-0.12) 
PhDs and civil engineers 0.01 (2.09) ** 0.01 (1.42) 
Master -0.00 (-0.91) -0.01 (-1.49) 
Tax credit R&D 0.00 (0.16) 0.00 (0.30) 
Tax deduction 80% patent income -0.00 (-0.72) -0.00 (-0.05) 
Control variables:   
Share PhD  0.34 (2.33) *** 
Share University - Tertiary (2nd stage)   0.30 (2.81) *** 
Share Tertiary (1st stage)  0.24 (2.18) *** 
Value added -0.00 (-0.06) -0.01 (-0.84) 
Number of employees 0.06 (1.18) 0.02 (0.31) 
Age 0.07 (0.90) 0.09 (1.01) 
Capital intensity     0.06 (2.28) ** 0.08 (2.61) *** 
R-squared (within) 0.23 0.07 
Number of observations 5,326 4,023 
Note:  The table shows the results of fixed effects (within) panel estimation using the average wage of R&D employees as dependent variable. 
Region and industry-year dummies are included in the estimations. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs from zero 
at a statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
The efficiency of public support to business R&D may differ for specific sub-groups of firms. The crite-
rion that is most often used to distinguish firms is firm size. Straathof et al. (2014) conclude that it is 
difficult to draw conclusions on efficiency by firm size as results differ across studies and countries. 
They point at some evidence that the impact of support for start-up firms exceeds the average impact 
but conclude that there is also not much evidence on how efficiency of tax incentives varies with firm 
age. Table 14 reports the results of fixed effects panel estimation for four different groups of firms, dis-
tinguished by number of employees. Except for the tax deduction of 80% of patent income, all coeffi-
cients of public support are positive and statistically significant for firms with up to 50 employees.  
For the other groups, the results are more mixed. In the group of firms with 50 up to 100 employees 
only the impact of the partial exemption of the withholding tax for R&D employees with a PhD or civil 
engineering degree is statistically significant. For larger firms, more elasticity estimates are statistically 
significant although the coefficients tend to be smaller than for the group of firms with up to 50 employ-
ees. For firms with more than 250 employees, the negative coefficient for the tax credit is also statistically 
significant. This result suggests that a limit may be warranted, especially given the high budgetary cost 
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of the tax credit and the lack of indications of its efficiency. The extremely high coefficient for Young 
Innovative Companies for the group of firms with 100 up to 250 employees is not reliable and is some-
what problematic as not many Young Innovative Companies could be expected to belong to this firm 
size category (see discussion of the results of table 15 on the issue of Young Innovative Companies).  
Table 14  Results of fixed effects panel estimation by firm size (2003-2015) 
 # employees<= 50 
50 < # employees
<= 100
100 < # employees 
<= 250 250 < # employees 
Dependent variable (R&D expenditures net of public support) 
Explanatory variables:     
Regional subsidy 0.08 (5.03) *** 0.05 (1.38) 0.08 (2.36) ** 0.07 (2.47) ** 
Research cooperation 0.13 (3.43) *** 0.08 (1.03) 0.10 (1.64) * 0.08 (1.74) * 
Young Innovative Company 0.08 (2.35) **        -0.01 (-0.12) 1.41 (8.33) *** 0.22 (1.36) 
PhDs and civil engineers 0.07 (2.94) *** 0.13 (2.25) ** -0.02 (-0.50) 0.09 (2.14) ** 
Master 0.14 (5.50) *** 0.02 (0.40) 0.13 (2.97) *** 0.12 (2.78) *** 
Tax credit R&D 0.10 (2.43) **          0.12 (0.65) -0.02 (-0.37) -0.08 (-2.15) ** 
Tax deduction 80%  
patent income 0.06 (1.47) -0.04 (-0.85) -0.07 (-1.34) -0.06 (-1.41) 
Control variables:     
Value added -0.12 (-1.13)  0.03 (0.13) -0.20 (-1.84) * -0.09 (-0.35) 
Number of employees 1.88 (7.58) *** 1.32 (1.13) 1.09 (1.15) 2.83 (3.22) *** 
Age -1.60 (-3.22) *** 1.16 (0.56) 0.25 (0.17) -1.12 (-0.77) 
Capital intensity 0.35 (3.26) *** -0.12 (-0.37) 0.16 (0.43) 0.83 (2.02) ** 
R-squared (within) 0.16 0.31 0.39 0.38 
Number of observations 9,555 2,293 2,200 2,232 
Note:  The table shows the results of fixed effects (within) estimation by size category. All variables are considered in logs. Industry-year 
dummies are included in all estimations. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs from zero at a statistical significance 
level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
Table 15 shows the results of fixed effects panel estimation by age group. The age of a firm is defined 
by the date of incorporation. There are substantial differences between age group in estimates and sta-
tistical significance. There are more indications of input additionality for firms that exist for more than 
10 years. The most troubling finding is the statistically significant positive coefficient for the partial 
exemption for Young Innovative Companies in the group of firms that are between 11 and 20 years old.   
There is an obvious age condition for companies to be eligible for the partial exemption of the withhold-
ing tax for Young Innovative Companies. To be eligible, a company should exist for less than 10 years 
before the beginning of the year of application of the partial exemption.27 So, in principle there should 
not be any company that benefits from this scheme in the group of firms between 11 and 20 years old. 
However, as graph 13 shows, according to the information on the date of incorporation, in every year 
since the introduction of this scheme in 2006, some firms appear to have existed for more than 10 years 
at the time that they benefitted from this specific tax incentive. The share of firms that benefit from the 
partial exemption for Young Innovative Companies, despite apparently not being eligible according to 
their age, increased gradually between 2008 and 2012, when it reached 18.75%. After 2012, the share 
decreased slightly although it was still 14% in 2015.       
                                                          
27  Based on the date of incorporation. 
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Table 15  Results of fixed effects panel estimation by firm age (2003-2015) 
 Age <= 5 5 < Age <= 10 10 < Age <= 20  Age > 20 
Dependent variable (R&D expenditures net of public support) 
Explanatory variables:     
Regional subsidy 0.00 (0.05) -0.01 (-0.36) 0.06 (3.02) *** 0.10 (5.60) *** 
Research cooperation 0.03 (0.59) 0.05 (0.71) 0.01 (0.27) 0.12 (3.26) *** 
Young Innovative Company 0.03 (0.53)          0.06 (0.79) 0.15 (3.32) *** 0.08 (0.79) 
PhDs and civil engineers 0.08 (1.06) 0.20 (2.66) *** -0.02 (-0.82) 0.07 (2.72) *** 
Master 0.16 (1.95) ** 0.11 (1.40) 0.20 (5.18) *** 0.12 (5.27) *** 
Tax credit R&D -0.01 (-0.11)          0.09 (1.04) 0.07 (0.95) -0.01 (-0.18) 
Tax deduction 80% 
patent income 0.04 (0.39) 0.07 (0.92) 0.01 (0.22) -0.01 (-0.42) 
Control variables:     
Value added 0.72 (5.83) *** -0.31 (-1.89) ** -0.05 (-0.43) 0.04 (0.24) 
Number of employees 1.43 (4.08) *** 2.10 (2.81) *** 1.23 (2.78) *** 2.14 (7.10) *** 
Age -0.98 (-2.03) ** -0.80 (-0.22) -0.66 (-0.26) -4.13 (-1.45) 
Capital intensity 0.55 (2.48) ** 0.45 (1.52) 0.31 (1.41) 0.24 (1.62)  
R-squared (within) 0.59 0.40 0.22 0.15 
Number of observations 1,165 1,447 4,004 9,664 
Note:  The table shows the results of fixed effects (within) estimation by firm age. All variables are considered in logs. Industry-year dummies 
are included in all estimations. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs from zero at a statistical significance level 
of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 
 
Bodas Freitas et al. (2015) argue that public support to business R&D should be differentiated across 
industries given findings of substantial heterogeneity in the efficiency of public support. Considering 
the Pavitt taxonomy of industries, which categorizes industries by sources of technological knowledge 
and market structure, they report cross-country indications that R&D tax credits are more effective in 
science-based and specialized supplier industries than in supplier-dominated industries. Castellacci 
and Lie (2015) report somewhat diverging results. Table 16 shows the results of fixed effects panel esti-
mation for each Pavitt category, as proposed by Bogliacino and Pianta (2015): 
Graph 13  Share of Young Innovative Companies that are older than 10 years (2006-2015)  
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1. Science-Based: sectors in which innovation is based on advances in science and R&D, 
2.  Specialized Suppliers: sectors producing machinery and equipment that is used in new processes 
for other industries,  
3. Scale Intensive: sectors in which scale economies are relevant and a certain rigidity of production 
processes exists, technological change is usually incremental,  
4. Supplier-dominated: traditional sectors in which small firms are prevalent and technological change 
is introduced through the inputs and machinery provided by suppliers from other industries.  
The estimates clearly differ across the four Pavitt industry groups. Except for the R&D tax credit and 
the tax deduction of 80% of patent income, all elasticity estimates are positive and statistically signifi-
cant for all support schemes in science-based industries. 
Table 16  Results of fixed effects panel estimation by Pavitt category (2003-2015) 
 Science-based Specialized Suppliers Scale Intensive Supplier-dominated 
Dependent variable (R&D expenditures net of public support) 
Explanatory variables:     
Regional subsidy 0.03 (1.88) * 0.07 (3.31) *** 0.07 (2.79) *** 0.07 (2.84) *** 
Research cooperation 0.10 (1.72) * 0.12 (1.80) * 0.07 (1.61) * 0.08 (1.65) * 
Young Innovative Company 0.13 (2.72) ***         0.05 (0.95) 0.19 (0.90) 0.24 (1.72) * 
PhDs and civil engineers 0.12 (2.81) *** 0.08 (1.90) * 0.07 (1.84) * 0.06 (1.69) * 
Master 0.13 (4.63) *** 0.12 (2.93) *** 0.10 (2.59) *** 0.17 (4.75) *** 
Tax credit R&D 0.02 (0.39)         0.02 (0.86) 0.01 (0.36) 0.17 (1.65) * 
Tax deduction 80%  
patent income -0.03 (-1.04) 0.02 (0.58) -0.05 (-1.62) * 0.07 (1.48) 
Control variables:     
Value added 0.17 (0.89) 0.13 (1.03) 0.38 (1.75) * -0.14 (-0.81) 
Number of employees 1.91 (4.64) *** 1.79 (5.32) *** 0.86 (1.36) 1.66 (4.44) *** 
Age -2.31 (-2.81) *** -1.74 (-3.23) *** -2.49 (-1.58)  -1.96 (-1.52)  
Capital intensity 0.40 (2.25) ** 0.37 (2.17) ** 0.34 (1.09) 0.43 (2.10) ** 
R-squared (within) 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.12 
Number of observations 3,296 3,832 2,700 5,336 
Note:  The table shows the results of fixed effects (within) estimation by Pavitt category, using the updated classification of industries 
provided by Bogliacino and Pianta (2015). All variables are considered in logs. Industry-year dummies are included in all estimations. 
*, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs from zero at a statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. 
The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
For the three other Pavitt categories, the evidence is more mixed. For the R&D tax credit, the elasticity 
is positive in supplier-dominated industries which seems to be in contrast with the results reported by 
Bodas Freitas et al. (2015), although the estimate is only statistically significant at 10%.    
Halpern and Muraközy (2015) offer a recent overview of the literature on the link between market com-
petition and R&D investment. Table 17 shows the results of fixed effects estimation of specification (1) 
in which industries are grouped by average market concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), which sums the squared market shares of firms in an industry. The HHI ranges 
from 1/N to 1, N being the number of active firms. The closer HHI is to 1, the more concentrated the 
market. Industries are grouped by quartile with the first quartile grouping the two-digit industries with 
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the lowest average HHI over the period 2003-2015. The results in Table 17 indicate that the estimated 
elasticity tends to decrease with rising market concentration. In contrast with the estimates reported in 
table 10 up to table 16, the elasticity of the tax deduction of 80% of patent income is statistically signifi-
cant positive for the first HHI quartile and the elasticity of the R&D tax credit is statistically significant 
positive for the second HHI quartile. Although the HHI is probably not the best indicator of competition 
(see Halpern and Muraközy 2015)28, the results suggest that the efficiency of public support to business 
R&D may depend on the market structure and level of competition of industries. Industry-year dum-
mies, included when possible in the estimations, account for time-variant differences between indus-
tries in R&D investment, such as changes in market competition, but do not permit to assess the specific 
role of these differences.        
Table 17 Results of fixed effects panel estimation by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index quartile (2003-2015) 
 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
Dependent variable (R&D expenditures net of public support) 
Explanatory variables:     
Regional subsidy 0.09 (2.49) ** 0.05 (2.82) *** 0.07 (3.38) *** 0.07 (3.01) *** 
Research cooperation 0.12 (1.36) 0.18 (3.14) *** 0.08 (2.09) ** 0.09 (2.38) ** 
Young Innovative Company 0.17 (2.75) *** 0.13 (1.68) * 0.04 (0.81) -0.04 (-0.58) 
PhDs and civil engineers 0.08 (1.64) * 0.05 (1.59)  0.13 (2.94) *** 0.10 (2.59) *** 
Master 0.18 (5.02) *** 0.16 (4.62) *** 0.11 (3.33) *** 0.06 (1.82) * 
Tax credit R&D 0.02 (0.25) 0.10 (2.31) ** 0.03 (0.54) 0.00 (0.00) 
Tax deduction 80%  
patent income 0.13 (2.03) ** 0.02 (0.63) -0.00 (-0.10) -0.03 (-0.95) 
Control variables:     
Value added 0.35 (0.72) -0.28 (-1.41) 0.02 (0.19) 0.25 (1.29) 
Number of employees 1.72 (2.99) *** 1.48 (4.01) *** 1.74 (4.74) *** 0.95 (2.48) ** 
Age -1.86 (-1.89) * -2.19 (-3.61) *** -0.18 (-0.28) -1.68 (-1.62) 
Capital intensity 0.41 (1.81) * 0.56 (3.20) *** 0.38 (2.32) ** 0.05 (0.21) 
R-squared (within) 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.22 
Number of observations 2,804 4,318 4,720 4,438 
Note:  The table shows the results of fixed effects (within) estimation of specification (1) on p.27, by industry category. Industries are 
grouped by average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which provides an indication of market concentration (computed as the sum of the 
squared market shares of firms within the industry). Industries are grouped by HHI quartile with the 1st quartile grouping the industries 
with the lowest average market concentration. All variables are considered in logs. Industry-year dummies are included in all estima-
tions. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs from zero at a statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 
1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
Across different sub-groups of firms (categorized by size, age or industry) the most robust evidence of 
input additionality is found for the partial exemption of the withholding tax for R&D employees with 
a master’s degree.   
Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014) point out that as R&D projects take time to implement and are subject to 
adjustment costs. Money saved through public support to R&D may be used by companies to invest in 
R&D in the following years. Corporate research projects run over several years. Cincera and Fombasso 
Toyem (2018) find that more than half of the EUREKA29 projects have a duration of 4 up to 7 years. 
Public support may therefore impact R&D expenditures for several years. Cerulli (2010) considers a 
                                                          
28  The available data do not permit the calculation or estimation of other indicators of market competition.  
29  EUREKA Network Projects are transnational, market-driven innovative research and development projects, labelled by 
EUREKA and supported by the public administrations and public funding agencies that represent EUREKA in each of its 
member countries (https://www.eurekanetwork.org/content/eureka-network-projects). 
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specification to which lags of public support are added. For the two tax incentives that operate through 
corporate income taxation, the R&D tax credit and the tax deduction of 80% of patent income there is a 
discrepancy between the income year and the tax year. The tax incentives apply to income, and expend-
itures, in the previous year. In the baseline specification, the tax incentives based on corporate income 
taxation are linked to the previous year (income year) as that is the year for which the tax incentives are 
applied for. If a lag is considered for public support, this implies that these tax incentives are linked to 
the tax year.       
Table 18 presents the results of fixed effects panel estimation of the baseline specification in which the 
variables that reflect the amount of public support received by firms are lagged, by one and two years, 
respectively. In the last two columns, a lag of the dependent variable is also included. This lag captures 
the substantial persistence that can be found in R&D expenditures (see for recent evidence, Arqué-Cas-
tells and Mohnen 2015 and Busom, Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros 2017). The inclusion of a lagged de-
pendent variable may pose some problems (see discussion in Dumont 2015) so the results of these esti-
mations should be taken with caution.  
Table 18  Results of fixed effects panel estimation with lags (2003-2015) 
 One-year lag Two-year lag Lagged dependent 
Lagged dependent +  
Lagged support
Dependent variable (R&D expenditures net of public support)
Explanatory variables:  
Net R&D expenditures (t-1)    0.56 (45.48) *** 0.56 (45.84) *** 
Regional subsidy 0.03 (2.89) *** 0.01 (1.12) 0.02 (2.15) ** 0.02 (2.27) ** 
Research cooperation 0.07 (3.12) *** 0.03 (1.32) 0.04 (2.74) *** 0.01 (0.62) 
Young Innovative Company 0.08 (2.16) ** 0.05 (1.69) * 0.05 (1.35) 0.01 (0.19) 
PhDs and civil engineers 0.05 (2.99) *** 0.02 (1.45) 0.05 (3.98) *** 0.01 (1.41) 
Master 0.08 (4.75) *** 0.04 (2.55) ** 0.06 (5.14) *** 0.03 (3.55) *** 
Tax credit R&D 0.00 (0.17) 0.01 (0.69) -0.01 (-0.69) -0.01 (-0.47) 
Tax deduction 80% patent income -0.02 (-0.82) -0.01 (-0.54) 0.01 (0.82) -0.00 (-0.25) 
Control variables:     
Value added 0.13 (1.71) * 0.13 (1.95) * 0.02 (0.23)  0.03 (0.26) 
Number of employees 1.67 (7.33) *** 1.30 (4.63) *** 0.75 (5.06) *** 0.81 (5.33) *** 
Age -1.29 (-2.55) *** -0.90 (-1.37) -0.47 (-1.45)  -0.49 (-1.52)  
Capital intensity 0.30 (2.84) *** 0.13 (1.08) 0.17 (2.34) ** 0.18 (2.50) ** 
R-squared (within) 0.13 0.17 0.42 0.42 
Number of observations 11,267 7,010 10,967 10,967 
Note:  The table shows the results of fixed effects panel estimation in which lags of the explanatory variables and the dependent variable 
are included. All variables are considered in logs and industry-year dummies are included. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient 
estimate differs from zero at a statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust 
to heteroskedasticity.       
A more acceptable way to account for the persistence of R&D expenditures is dynamic panel estimation 
(see section 5.1.4). The results with different lags, reported in table 18, are to large extent in line with the 
results of the baseline panel estimation reported in table 10.    
As can be seen in table 8, firms combine different instruments of direct and indirect public support to 
R&D. Busom, Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros (2015) and Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015) argue that estimates 
for single policy instruments, without controlling for other available instruments, are subject to hidden 
treatment bias. The baseline specification (1) considers the impact of each individual support scheme, 
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controlling for the support provided through other support schemes. This precludes the hidden treat-
ment bias but does not provide indications on the possible complementarity or substitution between 
different policy instruments. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de La Potterie (2003) report cross-country 
macroeconomic evidence that direct and indirect public support to R&D are effective but that the effi-
ciency is reduced if one form of support is combined with other forms of support. There are relatively 
few firm-level studies on the complementarity of different public support schemes for business R&D 
and the results are rather mixed (Hægeland and Møen 2007; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento 2014; Guerzoni 
and Raiteri 2015; Marino et al. 2016; Dumont 2017; Montmartin, Herrera and Massard 2018). 
Table 19 shows the results of an estimation of the baseline specification to which variables have been 
added that reflect the support received by firms that combine different support schemes. Only the com-
binations for which the coefficient is statistically significant are shown.  
Table 19  Results of the estimation of the policy mix of public support for R&D (2003-2015) 
Dependent variable (R&D expenditures net of public support)  
Explanatory variables (individual support scheme):  
Regional subsidy 0.18 (11.26) *** 
Research cooperation 0.18 (5.94) *** 
Young Innovative Company 0.20 (4.95) *** 
PhDs and civil engineers 0.13 (7.51) *** 
Master 0.18 (9.73) *** 
Tax credit R&D 0.02 (1.00) 
Tax deduction 80% patent income 0.02 (1.03) 
Explanatory variables (combination support):  
Regional subsidy + Research cooperation -0.16 (-3.57) *** 
Regional subsidy + Young Innovative Company -0.15 (-4.25) *** 
Regional subsidy + PhDs and civil engineers -0.12 (-3.92) *** 
Regional subsidy + Master -0.14 (-4.43) *** 
Research cooperation + PhDs and civil engineers -0.07 (-2.00) ** 
Research cooperation + Tax deduction 80% patent income -0.19 (-8.00) *** 
Young Innovative Company + Master -0.09 (-2.19) ** 
PhDs and civil engineers + Master -0.05 (-2.17) ** 
Subsidy and at least two tax incentives -0.18 (-9.28) *** 
More than two tax incentives -0.03 (-1.48)  
R-squared (within)  0.06 
Number of observations 16,280 
Note:  The table shows the results of an estimation of the baseline specification to which terms are added which reflect the amount received 
by firms that combine support schemes. Only combinations for which the coefficient is statistically significant are shown. The four 
control variables that are considered in the previous estimations are also included in the estimation but not reported. All estimations 
use fixed effect (within) with industry and year dummies. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs from zero at a 
statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity.       
The coefficients of the combination of support variables should be interpreted as additional effects of 
combining two schemes relative to the individual schemes. A positive coefficient implies that combin-
ing the two schemes provides a complementary impact and a negative coefficient would indicate that 
the combination results in some crowding out of R&D expenditures. The last two variables reflect the 
effect of firms that combine direct support (subsidies) with at least two tax incentives and firms that 
combine at least three different tax incentives, respectively.  
WORKING PAPER 4-19 
46 
The statistical significance of the coefficients of the individual support schemes are in line with the re-
sults from the baseline estimation reported in table 10 but the estimated elasticity is higher. This indi-
cates that the single use of support schemes results in higher additionality than when the schemes are 
combined with other forms of support. This is further corroborated by the coefficients of the variables 
that reflect the combination of different support schemes, which are all negative. The coefficients of 
these variables support the results of the two previous evaluations of decreased efficiency of direct and 
indirect support when different support measures are combined. The negative impact of combining 
support schemes is even more substantial as the elasticity estimates are much larger.  
Raising the R&D intensity of a country can be achieved by raising the R&D intensity of R&D active 
firms (intensive margin) but also by inciting non-R&D active firms to start doing R&D. Estimations of 
the impact of public support on the probability to start R&D, using alternative definitions of R&D start-
ers, provide mostly non-significant estimates, except for a rather improbable statistically significant neg-
ative impact of the partial exemption for PhDs and civil engineers in one of the estimations. The results 
of these estimations are not reported but available upon request.30       
5.1.2. Robustness of estimates  
a. Selection model 
This section reports the results of the estimation of a two-step selection model, as proposed by Heckman 
(1979) and used for the evaluation of public support for R&D by Busom (2000) and Hussinger (2008). 
The first-step estimation considers variables that may explain whether a firm receives support for its 
R&D activities. From this estimation inverse Mills ratios can be computed which are then included in 
the second-step estimation, which is the actual estimation of the impact of public support on R&D ex-
penditures (baseline specification (1) on p.27). The statistical significance of the inverse Mills variables 
in the second-step estimation provides an indication on the relevance of the selection bias.  
The selection and self-selection by firms in the application for and obtaining of regional subsidies or tax 
incentives is likely to be explained by different firm and industry characteristics. Rather than using a 
bivariate selection, five possible categories of public support are considered: 
1) Firm receives no support for R&D, 
2) Firm receives a subsidy but no tax benefit, 
3) Firm receives a wage-based tax benefit (partial exemption) but no subsidy and no tax incentives 
through corporate income taxation (R&D tax credit and tax deduction 80% of patent income), 
4) Firm receives a tax benefit through corporate income taxation but no subsidy and no wage-
based tax benefit, 
5) Firm receives a subsidy, a wage-based tax benefit and a tax benefit through corporate income 
taxation. 
A two-step selection model estimation requires at least one variable that explains selection but not the 
actual dependent variable of interest, which in this paper is R&D expenditures. As some subsidy 
                                                          
30  As the dependent variable is binary (start R&D or not) a logit estimation is considered. Inclusion of industry dummies results 
in non-convergence of the iterative estimation procedure.    
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programmes explicitly target SMEs whereas the SME criterion is not relevant for the level of R&D ex-
penditures, a binary SME variable is considered in the first-step estimation but not in the second step. 
The lags of public support and R&D expenditures are also included in the first-step but not in the sec-
ond-step estimation so there are five exclusion variables.           
 The results of the estimation of the selection model are reported in table 20. The coefficients in the table 
are the relative risk ratios which denote the change in probability to belong to a group, relative to the 
benchmark group (firms that receive no support), for a unit change in the explanatory variable, with 
the other variables held constant. A coefficient below 1 indicates that an increase in that explanatory 
variable reduces the probability to belong to that group relative to the group of firms that receive no 
support. A relative risk ratio below 1 implies a negative t-value. Past R&D expenditures and past public 
support very significantly explain group membership of firms. For example, a firm that received direct 
support in the previous year will much more likely also receive direct support but no tax support in this 
year than to receive no support at all. If a firm had R&D activities in the previous year, this increases 
the probability that it will receive support for its current R&D.  
Table 20  Determinants of receiving public support for R&D (2003-2015) – first step of selection model 
Dependent variable:  
category of public support 
Subsidy 
no tax benefit 
No subsidy
Tax emption 
no CIT benefit
No subsidy
 No tax exemption 
CIT benefit
Subsidy 
 Tax exemption 
CIT benefit
Explanatory variables:     
Lag R&D expenditures  1.07(5.79) *** 1.11 (9.47) *** 1.08 (2.13) ** 1.01 (0.33) 
Lag regional subsidy 1.24 (23.80) *** 0.79 (-23.02) *** 0.77 (-4.17) *** 1.20 (9.92) *** 
Lag partial exemption 0.72 (-12.67) *** 1.39 (39.32) *** 0.54 (-5.86) *** 1.22 (7.04) *** 
Lag CIT-based benefit 0.78 (-3.54) *** 0.69 (-16.80) *** 1.64 (14.08) *** 1.26 (13.66) *** 
Value added 0.93 (-1.04)  1.01 (0.14) 1.06 (0.21) 0.97 (-0.38) 
Age 0.72 (-5.94) *** 0.94 (-1.39) 1.15 (0.72) 0.86 (-1.41) 
Capital intensity 1.09 (2.67) *** 0.99 (-0.53) 1.22 (2.06) ** 1.02 (0.31) 
SME (0/1) 1.01 (0.03) 0.89 (-0.96) 1.18 (0.27) 0.92 (-0.33) 
Mc Fadden pseudo R-squared:  0.42  
Number of observations:  11,362  
Note: The table shows the results of multinomial logistic regression. The dependent variable is a categorical variable reflecting five possible 
situations in terms of public support for R&D: 1 (firm receives no support for R&D); 2 (firm receives a subsidy but no tax benefit); 3 
(firm receives partial exemption of the withholding tax but no subsidy and no tax benefit through corporate income taxation); 4 (firm 
receives no subsidy and no partial exemption but a tax benefit through corporate income taxation) and 5 (firm receive subsidies, 
partial exemption and tax benefits through corporate income taxation (CIT)). The table shows the results for the latter four categories 
relative to the benchmark group of no support. The coefficients denote the relative risk ratio which reflects the change in probability 
to belong to a group, relative to the benchmark group, for a unit change in the explanatory variable, with the other variables held 
constant. The SME dummy equals 1 for SMEs (employees<=250) and 0 for large firms. The estimation considers region and year dummies 
(not reported). *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs from zero at a statistical significance level of respectively 
10%, 5% and 1%.   
From the estimation of the selection model reported in table 20, four inverse Mills variables can be com-
puted which are included in the second-step estimation, the results of which are reported in table 21.  
The coefficient estimates of all inverse Mills variables are statistically significant, which indicates the 
need to account for selection in public support. However, the five exclusion variables included in the 
first-step estimation are rather problematic. The coefficient of the binary SME variable is not statistically 
significant for any public support group, so it does not appear to explain whether a firm receives sup-
port, even not whether a firm receives a subsidy. The four lag variables in the first step on the other 
hand are very significant but as the estimates reported in table 18 suggest, they also have statistically 
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significant coefficients when included as explanatory variables of R&D expenditures so their use as 
exclusion variables is equally questionable.31    
In contrast with the fixed effects estimation, the coefficients of all support schemes, including the coef-
ficients of the R&D tax credit and the tax deduction of 80%, of patent income, are positive and statisti-
cally significant in the second-step estimation of the two-step selection model. 
Table 21  Results of panel estimation accounting for (self-) selection (2003-2015) – second step of selection model 
Dependent variable: (R&D expenditures net of public support)  
Explanatory variables:  
Regional subsidy 0.07 (5.62) *** 
Research cooperation 0.06 (2.12) ** 
Young Innovative Company 0.13 (2.50) ** 
PhDs and civil engineers 0.06 (3.16) *** 
Master 0.13 (7.11) *** 
Tax credit R&D 0.18 (5.50) *** 
Tax deduction - 80% patent income 0.12 (4.29) *** 
Variables from selection model (derived from first step):  
Inverse Mills (subsidy, no tax benefit) 0.11 (9.68) *** 
Inverse Mills (partial exemption, no subsidy, no CIT benefit) 0.22 (12.33) *** 
Inverse Mills (CIT benefit, no subsidy, no partial exemption) 0.02 (2.89) *** 
Inverse Mills (subsidy, partial exemption and CIT benefit) 0.08 (3.37) *** 
Control variables:  
Value added 0.08 (0.72) 
Number of employees 1.36 (6.09) *** 
Age -1.22 (-2.34) ** 
Capital intensity 0.18 (1.69) * 
R-squared (within) 0.19 
Number of observations 10,967 
Note:  The table shows the results of a fixed effects (within) estimation of the baseline panel specification (1) in which four inverse Mills 
ratios, computed from the first-step estimation of the selection model, reported in table 20, are included to account for (self-) 
selection. The estimation includes industry-year dummies. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs from zero at a 
statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
If the four lag variables of the first-step estimation are also included in the second step, the coefficient 
of lagged R&D expenditures is highly significant, whereas the coefficients of the lagged support varia-
bles are not statistically significant. In this estimation the coefficient of the partial exemption for Young 
Innovative Companies, the R&D tax credit and the tax deduction for 80% of patent income are not sta-
tistically significant. 
b. Instrumental variables 
In the baseline specification, endogeneity of the support variables on the right-hand side is likely as 
firms decide autonomously whether to apply for public support and for which amount of R&D support 
is requested. Endogeneity may result in biased estimates of input additionality. The most common econ-
ometric approach that is used to tackle endogeneity is instrumental variables (IV) estimation. A valid 
                                                          
31  Sartori (2003) points out that in the absence of exclusion variables, identification in a two-step Heckman model depends on 
the assumptions oh the distribution of the residuals alone. She proposes a maximum-likelihood estimator that is based on the 
additional identifying assumption that the error term for an observation is the same in both steps. 
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instrument is a variable that is exogenous (not correlated with the residual term) but that is correlated 
with the assumed endogenous variable. This section reports the results of two alternative IV estimations. 
Table 22 shows the two alternative lists of instruments. For example, the changes in the rate of exemp-
tion of the partial exemption of the withholding tax are used to construct some instruments. In 2008, the 
rate of exemption was raised to 65%, from 50% for the first two schemes of partial exemption and from 
25% for the two schemes based on the education degree of R&D employees. For all four schemes the 
rate was further raised to 75% in 2009 and to 80% in 2013.  
Table 22  List of instruments 
 Instruments 1 Instruments 2 
Regional subsidy Average subsidization rate by three-digit indus-
try 
Total amount of support (net of support firm)
by three-digit industry  
Research cooperation Share of firms that cooperate in three-digit in-
dustry * (rate of partial exemption if firm did 
not receive same benefit in previous year OR 
change in rate of partial exemption if firm also 
received this benefit in previous year)   
Rate of partial exemption if firm did not receive 
same benefit in previous year OR change in rate 
of partial exemption if firm also received this 
benefit in previous year   
Young Innovative 
Company 
Share of young firms (age<=10 years) in three-
digit industry * (rate of partial exemption if firm 
did not receive same benefit in previous year 
OR change in rate of partial exemption if firm 
also received this benefit in previous year)   
Rate of partial exemption if firm did not receive 
same benefit in previous year OR change in rate 
of partial exemption if firm also received this 
benefit in previous year   
PhDs and civil  
engineers 
Average share of researchers with a PhD in total 
number of employees by three-digit industry * 
(rate of partial exemption if firm did not re-
ceive same benefit in previous year OR change 
in rate of partial exemption if firm also re-
ceived this benefit in previous year)   
Rate of partial exemption if firm did not receive 
same benefit in previous year OR change in rate 
of partial exemption if firm also received this 
benefit in previous year   
Master Average share of researchers with a university 
degree in total number of employees by three-
digit industry * (rate of partial exemption if firm 
did not receive same benefit in previous year 
OR change in rate of partial exemption if firm 
also received this benefit in previous year)   
Rate of partial exemption if firm did not receive 
same benefit in previous year OR change in rate 
of partial exemption if firm also received this 
benefit in previous year   
Tax credit R&D Total amount of tax credit by three-digit indus-
try 
Applicable rate of deduction if firm did not re-
ceive a tax credit in previous year OR change in 
the rate of deduction if firm also received tax 
credit in previous year   
Tax deduction 80%  
patent income 
Total amount of tax deduction by three-digit 
industry 
Applicable rate of deduction if firm did not re-
ceive a tax deduction in previous year OR 
change in the rate of deduction if firm also re-
ceived tax deduction in previous year   
Table 23 shows the results of a fixed effects IV estimation using the first and the second list of instru-
ments, respectively, and a random effects estimation using the second list of instruments.32 Lags of the 
support variables are also included as instruments. The table shows the results of several tests of the 
validity of the instruments.   
The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions tests the crucial assumption that the instruments are not 
correlated with the residual term of the second-stage regression.33  
                                                          
32  Lichtenberg (1988) points out that IV estimation with fixed effects will only provide good results if instruments are endoge-
nous with respect to omitted time-invariant characteristics. 
33  The IV estimation consists in two stages (two-stage least squares). In a first-stage estimation, all potentially endogenous var-
iables are regressed, separately, on the explanatory variables that are included in the second-stage estimation and the list of 
instrumental variables. In the second-stage estimation, the actual dependent variable (R&D expenditures) is regressed on the 
exogenous variables and the fitted values, from the first-stage estimation. of the potentially endogenous variables.     
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Table 23  Results of instrumental variables estimation (2003-2015) 
 Instruments 1 Instruments 2 Random Effects 
Dependent variable:  
(R&D expenditures net of public support) 
   
Explanatory variables:    
Regional subsidy 0.05 (0.92) 0.16 (1.99) ** 0.26 (8.37) *** 
Research cooperation 0.10 (1.75) * 0.11 (1.70) * 0.14 (3.79) *** 
Young Innovative Company 0.04 (0.38) 0.16 (1.49) 0.24 (6.16) *** 
PhDs and civil engineers 0.02 (0.62) 0.06 (1.74) * 0.17 (8.19) *** 
Master 0.17 (5.47) *** 0.13 (4.05) *** 0.17 (8.32) *** 
Tax credit R&D 0.03 (0.76) -0.00 (-0.08) -0.01 (-0.26) 
Tax deduction 80% patent income 0.03 (0.63) -0.04 (-0.79) -0.01 (-0.27) 
Control variables:    
Value added 0.09 (1.04) 0.14 (1.66) * 0.18 (2.54) *** 
Number of employees 1.29 (7.46) *** 1.48 (8.87) *** 0.46 (8.93) *** 
Age -0.45 (-1.10) -1.16 (-2.88) *** -0.44 (-4.96) *** 
Capital intensity 0.21 (2.36) ** 0.23 (2.87) *** 0.11 (2.83) *** 
Sargan (over-identification) 142.33 (0.00) *** 10.46 (0.21)  
Anderson (under-identification) 336.39 (0.00) *** 274.97 (0.00) ***  
Weak instrument (robust):    
Anderson-Rubin F 14.24 (0.00) *** 4.18 (0.00) ***  
Anderson-Rubin Chi2 202.92 (0.00) *** 59.34 (0.00) ***  
Stock-Wright  195.03 (0.00) *** 58.88 (0.00) ***  
Angrist-Pishke (under-identification):    
Regional subsidy 27.40 (0.00) *** 22.76 (0.00) ***  
Research cooperation 109.09 (0.00) *** 154.15 (0.00) ***  
Young Innovative Company 134.09 (0.00) *** 176.47 (0.00) ***  
PhDs and civil engineers 227.16 (0.00) *** 338.76 (0.00) ***  
Master 203.79 (0.00) *** 300.49 (0.00) ***  
Tax credit R&D 321.83 (0.00) *** 430.99 (0.00) ***  
Tax deduction - 80% patent income 146.67 (0.00) *** 235.46 (0.00) ***  
R-squared 0.09 0.06 0.04 
Number of observations 6,894 9,997 11,250 
Note:  The table shows the results of the second step of an instrumental variables estimation. The second column shows the results of an 
estimation in which instruments 1, listed in Table 22 are used in addition to lags of the support variables. The third column shows the 
results of an estimation in which instruments 2 are used in addition to lags of the support variables. The last column shows the results 
of an IV estimation with random effects, using the second list of instruments. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs 
from zero at a statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroske-
dasticity.  
As the null hypothesis is zero correlation, rejection provides an indication that (some) instruments are 
not valid or more generally that the model is not correctly specified. The relevance of instruments is 
tested with under-identification or weak instruments tests. The null hypothesis is zero correlation be-
tween the instrument(s) and the instrumented (endogenous) variable so that failure to reject would in-
dicate that the instruments are not relevant or weak. Both under-identification and weak identification 
tests for all instruments and tests for each instrumented support variable separately are reported. The 
tests appear to favour Instruments 2 over Instruments 1.  
The estimates of the fixed effects estimation with Instruments 2 corroborate the results of the plain fixed 
effects estimation reported in table 10 although the coefficient for Young Innovative Companies is not 
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statistically significant and the coefficients of the partial exemption for research cooperation and for 
R&D employees with a PhD or civil engineering degree are only significant at 10%. In contrast with the 
results of the selection model but in line with the results of the baseline panel estimation, the (negative) 
coefficient of the R&D tax credit and the tax deduction for 80% of patent income is not statistically sig-
nificant 
c. Dynamic panel 
In this section the results of dynamic panel estimation are reported. Dynamic panel estimation permits 
to account for the persistence in the dependent variable which seems appropriate given the evidence of 
high persistence in R&D activities (see Arqué-Castells and Mohnen 2015; Busom, Corchuelo and Mar-
tínez-Ros 2017). Table 24 shows the results of a two-step system Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation. Short-term effects can be distinguished from the long-term impact of public support. 
Long-term coefficients are computed as non-linear combinations of short-term estimates.  
The large statistically significant positive coefficient of the first lag of R&D expenditures reflects the 
substantial persistence in R&D expenditures. Due to the inclusion of three lags, necessary to ensure that 
the residuals are not serially correlated, the number of observations is only 4,402 compared to 16,280 in 
the baseline fixed effects panel estimation. The dynamic panel estimation provides indications of input 
additionality for the four partial exemption schemes. The long-term elasticity for these schemes is sub-
stantially larger than the short-term elasticity which may be explained by the adaptation costs involved 
in R&D activities and the fact that investment in R&D is often decided for the medium-term.   
The Arellano-Bond tests indicate first-order serial correlation of residuals, but no higher-order serial 
correlation, as expected in system GMM. The null hypothesis of the Sargan and Hansen test, that in-
struments are uncorrelated with residuals, is clearly rejected, suggesting that the instruments are not 
valid. This result is in line with the poor performance of GMM estimation for the French R&D tax credit, 
reported by Mulkay and Mairesse (2013). 
An alternative specification that permits to distinguish short-term from long-term effects is an error-
correction model (ECM). Estimation of such a model provides no statistically significant coefficient es-
timates.34 A possible explanation for the poor results of the ECM estimation may be the difference in 
order of integration of the variables as suggested by the panel unit root tests reported in table 25. Unit 
root tests assess the stationarity of time series. If a time series of a variable is stationary in level, the 
order of integration is said to be zero, labelled as I(0). If the time series is not stationary in level but in 
first difference, the order of integration is one, labelled as I(1). If the variable is only stationary after 
twice differencing its order of integration is two, labelled I(2).  
                                                          
34  The results of the estimation of two ECM are not reported but available upon request. 
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Table 24  Results of dynamic panel estimation (2003-2015) 
 Short-term Long-term 
Dependent variable:  
(R&D expenditures net of public support) 
  
Public support variables:   
Regional subsidy  0.01 (1.00) 0.06 (1.05) 
Research cooperation  0.04 (2.15) ** 0.21 (2.10) ** 
Young Innovative Company  0.11 (4.28) *** 0.61 (3.84) *** 
PhDs and civil engineers  0.08 (5.99) *** 0.43 (6.16) *** 
Master  0.05 (4.43) *** 0.28 (4.32) *** 
Tax credit R&D  -0.01 (-0.47) -0.03 (-0.47) 
Tax deduction 80% patent income  0.02 (1.59) 0.13 (1.59) 
Lags of dependent variable   
Net R&D expenditures (t-1) 0.88 (63.23) *** 
Net R&D expenditures (t-2) -0.23 (-7.50) *** 
Net R&D expenditures (t-3) 0.17 (6.64) *** 
Control variables:   
Value added -0.02 (-0.32) 
Number of employees 0.10 (1.61)  
Age -0.25 (-2.58) *** 
Capital intensity 0.28 (3.10) *** 
Arellano-Bond test AR (1) -10.76 (0.00) ***  
Arellano-Bond test AR (2) -0.80 (0.43)  
Arellano-Bond test AR (3) 1.45 (0.15)  
Arellano-Bond test AR (4) -0.56 (0.58)  
Sargan (over-identification) 1693.47 (0.00) ***  
Hansen (over-identification) 922.77 (0.01) ***  
Hansen test excluding group 908.74 (0.01) ***  
Difference (H0=exogeneity) 14.03 (0.17)  
Number of observations 4,402  
Note:  The table shows the results of a two-step system GMM with orthogonal deviations. For lags of the dependent variable GMM-style 
instruments are used and for the public support variables lags are used as instruments. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient 
estimate differs from zero at a statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust 
to heteroskedasticity and are corrected for the finite-sample bias of a two-step estimation. 
Table 25 reports the results of a Fisher panel unit root test (XTFISHER procedure in STATA) which has 
a null hypothesis of non-stationarity.35 To be stationary the null hypothesis should therefore be rejected.       
As can be seen, none of the main variables used in the baseline specification are stationary in level. For 
the partial exemption of the withholding tax for PhDs and civil engineers, the order of integration ap-
pears to be 1. Even after twice differencing, only three variables are stationary, in effect, R&D expendi-
tures and the two partial exemption schemes based on the educational degree of R&D employees.   
                                                          
35  Given that the panel is highly unbalanced, the Fisher test is appropriate.  
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Table 25  Panel unit root tests (2003-2015) 
 Level test I(0) First difference test I(1) Second difference test I(2) 
R&D expenditures (net of support) 1557.18 (1.00) 1123.72 (1.00) 1261.61 (0.00) *** 
Regional subsidy 969.41 (1.00) 636.65(1.00) 789.84 (1.00) 
Research cooperation 445.11 (1.00) 501.68 (1.00) 341.03 (1.00) 
Young Innovative Company 29.62 (1.00) 151.15 (1.00) 60.74 (1.00) 
PhDs and civil engineers 1399.96 (1.00) 2062.54 (0.03) ** 1367.38 (0.00) *** 
Master 856.41 (1.00) 1276.70 (1.00) 1752.06 (0.00) *** 
Tax credit R&D 205.31 (1.00) 179.65 (1.00) 366.37 (1.00) 
Tax deduction 80% patent income 87.35 (1.00) 130.68 (1.00)  368.76 (1.00) 
Note:  The table shows the results of panel unit root tests on the level, the first and second difference of R&D expenditures and the public 
support variables. The test has been performed using the Stata procedure XTFISHER which allows for unbalanced panels. The reported 
test is a Fisher panel augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test. The null hypothesis is that the variable contains a unit root, in effect, 
is not stationary. The *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs from zero at a statistical significance level of respec-
tively 10%, 5% and 1%. The reported values are the Fisher Chi-squares values with p-values in brackets. 
In line with the previous evaluation of the federal tax incentives, the results of the unit root test are 
problematic as they suggest that there cannot exist a long-term (cointegration) relationship between 
R&D expenditures and the amount of direct and indirect public support that firms receive. The panel is 
still not very long, in effect ten years at most for the tax incentives, so stationarity and unit root tests 
should be considered with caution, but the results suggest that caution may also be warranted in the 
interpretation of the previous results in this paper as the possibility of spurious correlation cannot be 
excluded.36  Another issue is that there are not many firms with long consecutive observations as indi-
cated by table 26 which shows the ten most common patterns of real responses by firms. Only 4% of 
observations result from firms for which R&D expenditures are reported for every year over the period 
2003-2015.  
Table 26  Time pattern of real responses R&D survey (internal R&D Expenditures) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
      1 1 
     1 1 1 1 
     1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
     1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
     1 1  1 1 
   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
     1 1 1 1   
     1 1 1 1  
 
 
                                                          
36  Spurious correlation denotes apparent high correlation between time series variables that is explained by a common time 
trend rather than by an actual ‘causal’ link between the variables. 
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5.1.3. Bang for the Buck 
The coefficient estimates of a specification with all variables expressed in logs can be interpreted in 
elasticity terms. For example, an estimate of 1 implies that an increase by 10% in the explanatory variable 
results in a 10% increase of the dependent variable. Input additionality is often denoted in terms of the 
Bang for the Buck (BFTB) which denotes how much euro in additional R&D expenditures results from 
one euro in public support. The BFTB can be computed from the elasticity estimates and the average 
R&D expenditures and the average amount of support received by firms. Based on the elasticity esti-
mates from the different alternative procedures reported in this paper, table 27 shows the BFTB com-
puted with averages. The BFTB is only reported for the elasticity estimates that are statistically signifi-
cant. The average amount of support is strongly influenced by large firms. As the results in table 14 
show, coefficient estimates are generally higher for small firms than for large firms. Applying coefficient 
estimates that reflect average effects to the average amount of support may therefore overestimate the 
BFTB. Table 27 therefore also shows an alternative BFTB computed with the median of R&D expendi-
tures and support.  
Table 27  Bang for the Buck based on alternative estimates (2003-2015) 
 Fixed  Effects 1 
Fixed 
Effects 2 Selection IV List 1 IV List 2 GMM ST GMM LT 
 (Table 10) (Table 10) (Table 21) (Table 23) (Table 23) (Table 24) (Table 24) 
Based on the mean        
Regional subsidy 0.68 0.68 0.51  1.27   
Research cooperation 2.85 2.85 1.38 2.62 2.92 1.53 8.02 
Young Innovative 
Company 4.23 4.94 4.44   5.35 29.67 
PhDs and civil engineers 0.59 0.59 0.43  0.48 0.78 4.17 
Master 1.64 1.64 1.47 2.31 1.71 0.86 4.83 
Tax credit R&D   0.14     
Tax deduction 80% 
patent income   0.07     
Based on the median        
Regional subsidy 0.16 0.16 0.13  0.31   
Research cooperation 0.96 0.96 0.48 0.95 0.92 0.32 1.67 
Young Innovative  
Company 0.59 0.69 0.63   0.54 3.00 
PhDs and civil engineers 0.26 0.26 0.19  0.21 0.26 1.40 
Master 0.54 0.54 0.50 0.76 0.54 0.19 1.08 
Tax credit R&D   0.22     
Tax deduction 80% 
patent income   0.23     
Note:  The table shows the Bang for the Buck (BFTB), an estimate of how much additional R&D expenditures result from one euro in public 
support received by companies. The BFTB is calculated at the mean and median, respectively, of net R&D expenditures and public 
support for non-missing observations in the given specification and the estimates of elasticity as reported (reference to table in 
brackets). Only estimates of elasticity that are statistically significant (at least at 10%) are considered.  
As R&D expenditures are denoted net of public support, the BFTB reported should be interpreted in 
net terms. For example, the BFTB of 0.68 for regional subsidies in the Fixed Effects 1 estimation implies 
that one euro results in 0.68-euro additional R&D, in addition to the one euro received in support. Indi-
cations of additionality are most robust for the partial exemption for research cooperation and – as in 
the previous evaluation – for R&D employees with a master’s degree.  
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For the other support schemes, not all estimation procedures provide statistically significant estimates. 
For the R&D tax credit and the tax deduction of 80% of patent income, the selection model is the only 
procedure to provide statistically significant indications of input additionality and even in this estima-
tion the BFTB is relatively low.  
Some of the BFTB estimates are unreliable, especially for the tax incentives with relatively few benefi-
ciaries such as the partial exemption of the withholding tax for research cooperation and for Young 
Innovative Companies. This indicates the difficulty of identification with relatively few observations. 
The BFTB based on the median rather than on the average seems to provide more reliable results.     
Graph 14 compares the average BFTB for each support scheme, over all statistically significant estimates 
in the third evaluation (2019), which covers the period 2003-2015, with the average BFTB over all statis-
tically significant estimates in the second evaluation (2015), which covers the period 2003-2011. As both 
evaluations do not cover the same period and as there are also differences in the estimation procedures 
the comparison is indicative at best.  
 
Given this caveat, the graph shows that the average estimate of the BFTB for the four partial exemption 
schemes is higher in the third evaluation than in the second evaluation. For the first three partial ex-
emption schemes the indications of additionality are moreover based on more robust estimates in the 
recent evaluation.  
As mentioned before, the average BFTB for the partial exemption for Young Innovative Companies is 
extremely high in the third evaluation and should be taken with considerable caution.  
The average BFTB for regional subsidies is, although still relatively high, lower in the third evaluation 
compared to the results from the previous evaluation. As (changes in) the policy mix of regional subsi-
dies is not adequately accounted for in the evaluation of the tax incentives, the variable on direct support 
Graph 14 Average BFTB of second evaluation (2003-2011) and third evaluation (2003-2015)  
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should be considered more as a control variable than as a variable that provides a reliable assessment 
of the efficiency of regional subsidies.  
The average BFTB for the R&D tax credit, based on a single statistically significant estimate, is even 
lower in the recent evaluation than in the previous evaluation. Whereas there were no statistically sig-
nificant estimates for the tax deduction for patent income in the previous evaluation, the only significant 
estimate results in a very low average BFTB of 0.07 in the third evaluation.      
5.2. Behavioural additionality  
The tax incentives introduced by the federal government aim at raising additional R&D expenditures. 
They may however also affect the characteristics of R&D activities such as the orientation of R&D (basic 
research, applied research or experimental development) or the educational composition of R&D em-
ployees. This chapter reports the results of a panel estimation of the impact of public support on these 
characteristics of R&D activities.   
Table 28 shows the results of an estimation of the effects of subsidies and tax benefits on the orientation 
of R&D activities. In the R&D Survey, companies are asked to provide the distribution of their R&D 
expenditures over three categories: basic research, applied research and experimental development. The 
response to this question only applies to one of the two years that the survey covers.  
As such observations are only available for odd years, which explains the lower number of observations, 
in addition to the fact that less firms respond to the question on orientation than on R&D expenditures.  
Table 28  Results of panel estimation of the impact on the orientation of R&D activities (2003-2015) 
Dependent variable:  
share in R&D expenditures Basic research Applied research 
Experimental  
development 
Explanatory variables:    
Regional subsidy 0.01 (1.31) -0.00 (-0.01) 0.00 (0.19) 
Research cooperation 0.01 (0.83) 0.00 (0.10) 0.03 (1.52) 
Young Innovative Company 0.02 (0.78) -0.05 (-2.08) ** 0.05 (1.94) ** 
PhDs and civil engineers -0.00 (-0.42) 0.00 (0.39) 0.02 (1.65) * 
Master 0.01 (0.60) -0.01 (-1.12) 0.03 (2.26) ** 
Tax credit R&D -0.01 (-0.51) 0.02 (1.06) 0.03 (1.57) 
Tax deduction 80% patent income -0.01 (-0.87) 0.02 (1.35) 0.03 (1.62) 
Control variables:    
Value added 0.08 (1.64) * 0.09 (1.63) * -0.20 (-3.38) *** 
Number of employees -0.03 (-0.21) -0.17 (-1.95) ** 0.21 (2.04) ** 
Age -0.53 (-2.20) ** 0.05 (0.29) -0.10 (-0.50) 
Capital intensity 0.12 (1.69) * 0.11 (2.37) ** -0.10 (-1.82) * 
R-squared (within) 0.27 0.14 0.34 
Number of observations 2,611 4,599 4,430 
Note:  The table shows the results of fixed effects (within) estimation of the baseline panel specification (1) by category of R&D orientation. 
The dependent variables are the shares of the three categories in total R&D expenditures. As these range between 0 and 1 the variables 
are logit-transformed. All estimations include industry-year dummies. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs from 
zero at a statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
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For three out of the four schemes of partial exemption there are statistically significant indications that 
they raise the share of R&D expenditures oriented towards experimental development, in line with the 
US evidence reported by Arora et al. (2018) that (especially large) firms tend to shift the focus of their 
R&D activities to product development and commercialization, away from basic research. 
Table 29 shows the results of an estimation of the impact of public support on the composition of R&D 
employment in terms of educational degree. The coefficient estimates are mostly not significant. The 
partial exemption for R&D employees with a master’s degree somewhat surprisingly appear to raise 
the share of PhDs and civil engineers whereas the partial exemption for research cooperation increases 
the share of R&D employees with a qualification below 1st stage tertiary education.  
Table 29  Results of panel estimation of the impact on the composition of R&D personnel (2003-2015) 
Dependent variable:  
share in R&D employment 
PhD University – Tertiary (2nd stage) Tertiary 1
st stage Other qualifications 
Explanatory variables:     
Regional subsidy -0.00 (-0.11) 0.01(1.12) -0.02 (-1.83) * -0.01 (-0.97) 
Research cooperation -0.01 (-0.83) -0.00 (-0.14) -0.01 (-0.59) 0.03 (2.34) ** 
Young Innovative Company -0.03 (-1.07) 0.01 (0.55) 0.01 (0.32) -0.00 (-0.20) 
PhDs and civil engineers -0.00 (-0.07) 0.01 (1.18) -0.00 (-0.28) 0.00 (0.05) 
Master 0.03 (2.48) ** -0.01 (-1.31) -0.01 (-1.31) 0.01 (0.62) 
Tax credit R&D 0.00 (0.45) -0.00 (-0.38) 0.00 (0.47) -0.00 (-0.18) 
Tax deduction 80% patent income 0.01 (0.78) -0.00 (-0.44) -0.00 (-0.16) -0.01 (-0.54) 
Control variables:     
Value added 0.03 (1.04) 0.02 (0.51) -0.02 (-0.81) -0.03 (-1.35)  
Number of employees -0.04 (-0.37) 0.15 (2.07) ** -0.17 (-1.71) * -0.27 (-2.14) ** 
Age 0.01 (0.06) -0.06 (-0.37) 0.01 (0.08) -0.21 (-0.69) 
Capital intensity -0.05 (-0.76) -0.00 (-0.03) -0.04 (-0.81) -0.02 (-0.31) 
R-squared  0.24 0.34 0.17 0.20 
Number of observations 1,887 3,608 2,667 1,674 
Note:  The table shows the results of fixed effects panel regression, using the logit of the shares of specific groups of R&D personnel, grouped 
by educational degree. All estimations include industry-year dummies. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs from 
zero at a statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
5.3. Output additionality  
This chapter reports the results of estimations of the impact of public support to business R&D on 
productivity, profitability and the number of patents granted to firms in Belgium. 
Business R&D is generally perceived as an important determinant of innovation, technological progress 
and productivity growth. The potential impact results from the direct contribution to the performance 
of R&D active companies but also from spillovers of these R&D activities to the rest of the economy. 
Spillovers are at the core of the argument for public support to business R&D as they imply that the 
social return to R&D exceeds the private return to R&D active firms. Given that the return to firms is 
uncertain and highly skewed, they may invest less in R&D than optimal from a social point of view. 
Although the aim of the tax incentives introduced by the federal government is to raise the input of the 
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R&D process, it is therefore also of interest to assess the potential impact of public support on the output 
of R&D.  
Bloom et al. (2017) provide product-, firm- and industry-level evidence that the productivity of research 
activities has been falling for decades. To sustain growth, research effort needs to be raised to offset the 
decline in research productivity. The fact that productivity growth in Belgium has not increased sub-
stantially since 2005 despite the relatively strong increase in R&D intensity seems to corroborate these 
findings.   
The main difficulty in assessing the output of R&D activities is the low success rate of R&D projects. 
Stevens and Burley (1997) report evidence that only about 1% of small R&D projects that are initiated 
can be considered successful. For projects closer to the actual development of products they consider 
odds between 1 in 7 up to 1 in 10. Estimates of the average return to R&D may fail to reflect the dispro-
portionate positive contribution of the small number of very successful projects. Ugur et al. (2016) con-
clude, from a recent meta-regression based on 65 studies, that the private and social return to R&D is 
very heterogenous across studies and is smaller than what is reported in previous reviews. They rec-
ommend more attention to the lag structure of R&D investment, to assess the long-term impact and 
spillovers. Although spillovers are more likely to be captured at the industry-level or the economywide 
level, some of the estimations reported in this chapter include variables reflecting intra- and inter-in-
dustry spillovers. 
Corredoira et al. (2018) find that research funded by the US federal government is associated with more 
active and diverse technological trajectories and appears to be linked to breakthrough inventions. Tor-
regrosa-Hetland et al. (2019) report evidence for Finland and Sweden that public funding of research 
projects and research cooperation plays an increasingly prominent role in significant innovations.  
In their seminal paper, Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998) propose a model to estimate the link be-
tween R&D, innovation and productivity. Lööf, Mairesse and Mohnen (2017) offer a recent review of 
what is generally labelled as the CDM model. Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998) acknowledge that 
firms do not necessarily have to do R&D to innovate or to be productive. As such, firms without R&D 
activities can also be included in the estimation. As the evaluation of the Belgian R&D tax incentives 
focuses on R&D active firms, the estimations reported in this chapter only consider the impact of R&D 
and distinguishes R&D active firms by the type of public support that they receive. 
Table 30 shows the results of a panel regression of the impact of R&D expenditures on labour produc-
tivity (value added per employee) with firms grouped by the type of public support that they receive. 
Following Lehto (2007), the spillover variables denote the sum of R&D expenditures of all firms within 
the same industry (intra-industry) or the sum of R&D expenditures of all firms in other industries (inter-
industry). R&D expenditures of firms are subtracted from the intra-industry sum of R&D expenditures. 
For the spillover variables a distinction is also made between firms that receive public support and firms 
that do not. To control for a potential selection bias, a first-step estimation of the probability to receive 
public support is considered, as in section 5.1.2, with the lag of labour productivity as one of the explan-
atory variables.  
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Table 30  Results of panel estimation of the impact on labour productivity (2003-2015)  
Dependent variable: Labour productivity No spillover variables Spillover variables included 
Explanatory variables (R&D expenditures):   
One-year lag labour productivity 0.25 (2.86) *** 0.17 (1.31) 
No public support -0.01 (-2.10) ** -0.02 (-2.03) ** 
Direct support only  0.16 (2.84) *** 0.21 (2.47) *** 
Partial exemption only -0.05 (-3.06) *** -0.05 (-2.18) ** 
CIT incentives only -0.09 (-2.47) *** -0.09 (-1.90) * 
Direct support and partial exemption 0.15 (2.26) ** 0.24 (2.24) ** 
Direct support and CIT incentives 0.10 (2.38) ** 0.19 (2.46) ** 
Partial exemption and CIT incentives -0.08 (-2.92) *** -0.05 (-1.32) 
Direct, partial exemption and CIT 0.08 (1.87) 0.19 (2.17) *** 
Spillovers    
Intra-industry no support  -0.05 (-1.16)  
Intra-industry only subsidies  -0.01 (-1.33) 
Intra-industry only tax incentives  0.04 (2.62) *** 
Intra-industry subsidies and tax incentives  0.04 (3.81) *** 
Inter-industry no support  -0.03 (-0.14) 
Inter-industry only subsidies  -0.26 (-3.00) *** 
Inter-industry only tax incentives  0.14 (2.46) *** 
Inter-industry subsidies and tax incentives  0.24 (2.19) ** 
R-squared  0.50 0.52 
Number of observations 11,116 7,042 
Note:  The table shows the results of a fixed effects panel regression, using labour productivity defined as value added per full-time equiva-
lent employee as dependent variable and R&D expenditures of firms by group according to which type of public support that they 
receive, as explanatory variables. CIT: corporate income taxation (R&D tax credit and tax deduction for 80% of patent income). All 
variables are considered in logs. Estimations include year and industry dummies and four inverse Mills variables computed from the 
estimation of a selection model in which a lag of labour productivity is included. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate 
differs from zero at a statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to 
heteroskedasticity.  
The estimation reported in table 30 includes four inverse Mills ratios computed from this first-step esti-
mation. Acknowledging the well-known persistence of productivity (see, for example, Raymond et al. 
2010), the lag of labour productivity is also included. The statistically significant positive coefficient of 
lagged productivity confirms persistence. All variables on R&D expenditures by support group are in-
cluded with a one-year lag, reflecting the delay in the impact of R&D activities. Estimations with longer 
lags tend to provide less significant results.37   
Results suggest substantial differences in the impact of R&D on labour productivity, depending on 
which type of public support that firms receive. Most statistically significant positive coefficients fall 
within the 0.01-0.25 range reported for research productivity by Hall, Mairesse and Mohnen (2010).    
The strongest positive impact on productivity is found for firms that receive subsidies, whether they 
only benefit from subsidies or combine subsidies with partial exemption from payment of the withhold-
ing tax. Apparently, for firms that receive tax incentives through (CIT) corporate income taxation (R&D 
tax credit and tax deduction for 80% of patent income) the impact of R&D is negative, for single use and 
if combined with support through partial exemption.  
                                                          
37  These results are not reported but available upon request. 
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The relatively strong negative coefficients of R&D expenditures of firms that benefit from tax incentives 
through corporate income taxation are hard to explain. This result seems to hint at the impact of profit 
shifting by multinational enterprises on measured productivity. Guvenen et al. (2017) provide evidence 
for the U.S. that productivity of domestic firms is underestimated as multinationals attribute part of 
economic activity to foreign affiliates. 
Profit-shifting by US multinationals results in a considerable undermeasurement of aggregate produc-
tivity growth. Undermeasurement appears to be notable in R&D-intensive industries, as they produce 
intangible assets that can swiftly be moved across borders. Guvenen et al. (2017) find that value added 
in R&D-intensive industries increases by up to 8 percent annually in the mid-2000s if corrected for 
profit-shifting. The Belgian Policy Mix database so far does not contain a variable that reflects possible 
affiliation of firms to a domestic or foreign multinational group. This information may be a worthwhile 
addition to the data for future analysis.          
The opposite signs of the impact of R&D and productivity may explain why if only a single variable for 
R&D expenditures is considered, the estimate of its impact on productivity is very small (negative) and 
not statistically significant.38 The results indicate the need to account for firm heterogeneity in the im-
pact of R&D expenditures and suggest that the type of public support that firms receive may be in-
formative although caution in the interpretation of the results is warranted given the caveat of the po-
tential impact of profit-shifting.   
The estimation that includes spillover variables, reported in the third column in table 30, confirms the 
results for the effects of R&D by type of support group in the second column.  Whereas a positive impact 
of own R&D is mainly found for firms that receive direct support (subsidies), spillovers result more 
from firms that benefit from tax incentives, with indications of substantial inter-industry spillovers.  Es-
timates suggest negative inter-industry spillovers from firms that only receive direct support. On the 
other hand, for firms that combine subsidies with tax incentives, inter-industry spillovers are positive 
and substantial.  
The coefficient of the lag of productivity is not statistically significant when spillover variables are in-
cluded. This could indicate that the lag to some extent reflects the capacity of firms to absorb the 
knowledge that results from the R&D activities of other firms.  
The impact of R&D on productivity may differ according to the orientation of R&D activities. The fol-
lowing three tables (table 31 up to table 33) show the results of a panel estimation of the impact of R&D 
on productivity, by type of support group, in which firms are split into two groups depending on 
whether they belong to the bottom or the upper half of the distribution in terms of the average share of 
R&D expenditures oriented towards respectively, basic research, applied research and experimental 
development. The results are to a large extent in line with the results reported in the second column of 
table 30 but reveal substantial differences between firms depending on which group they belong to. For 
example, the positive effects of R&D for firms that receive direct support, above all apply to firms with 
a share oriented towards basic research or applied research below the median and a share oriented 
towards experimental development above the median. 
                                                          
38  Results are not reported but available upon request. 
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Table 31  Results of panel estimation of the impact on labour productivity by share basic research (2003-2015)  
 Bottom 50% basic research Top 50% basic research 
Dependent variable: Labour productivity   
Explanatory variables (R&D expenditures):   
One-year lag labour productivity 0.13 (1.25)  0.31 (3.34) *** 
No public support -0.02 (-2.03) ** -0.01 (-1.42) 
Direct support only  0.24 (2.44) ** 0.13 (1.97) ** 
Partial exemption only -0.08 (-2.48) ** -0.03 (-2.50) ** 
CIT incentives only -0.10 (-2.33) ** -0.08 (-1.64) * 
Direct support and partial exemption 0.22 (2.22) ** 0.13 (1.54) 
Direct support and CIT incentives 0.22 (2.26) ** 0.06 (1.44) 
Partial exemption and CIT incentives -0.07 (-1.66) * -0.09 (-2.40) ** 
Direct, partial exemption and CIT 0.18 (1.89) * 0.05 (1.06) 
R-squared  0.54 0.49 
Number of observations 4,589 5,215 
Note:  The table shows the results of fixed effects panel regression, using labour productivity defined as value added per full-time equivalent 
employee as dependent variable and a one-year lag of R&D expenditures of firms by group according to which type of public support 
that they receive. CIT: corporate income taxation (R&D tax credit and tax deduction for 80% of patent income). The second (third) 
column shows the results for the 50% of firms with the lowest (highest) share of R&D expenditures oriented towards basic research. 
Estimations include year and industry dummies and four inverse Mills variables computed from the estimation of a selection model in 
which a lag of labour productivity is included. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs from zero at a statistical 
significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
 
Table 32  Results of panel estimation of the impact on labour productivity by share applied research (2003-2015)  
 Bottom 50% applied research Top 50% applied research 
Dependent variable: Labour productivity   
Explanatory variables (R&D expenditures):   
One-year lag labour productivity 0.28 (2.88) *** 0.15 (0.89) 
No public support -0.02 (-1.73) * -0.00 (-0.22) 
Direct support only  0.23 (2.35) ** 0.08 (2.22) ** 
Partial exemption only -0.06 (-1.89) * -0.03 (-2.24) ** 
CIT incentives only -0.11 (-1.79) * -0.06 (-2.55) *** 
Direct support and partial exemption 0.23 (1.80) * 0.07 (1.78) * 
Direct support and CIT incentives 0.12 (1.67) * 0.05 (1.39) 
Partial exemption and CIT incentives -0.11 (-2.64) *** -0.04 (-1.89) * 
Direct, partial exemption and CIT 0.13 (1.60) 0.04 (0.91) 
R-squared  0.42 0.63 
Number of observations 4,962 4,860 
Note:  The table shows the results of fixed effects panel regression, using labour productivity defined as value added per full-time equivalent 
employee as dependent variable and a one-year lag of R&D expenditures of firms by group according to which type of public support 
that they receive, as explanatory variables. CIT: corporate income taxation (R&D tax credit and tax deduction for 80% of patent 
income). The second (third) column shows the results for the 50% of firms with the lowest (highest) share of R&D expenditures oriented 
towards applied research. Estimations include year and industry dummies and four inverse Mills variables computed from the estima-
tion of a selection model in which a lag of labour productivity is included. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs 
from zero at a statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroske-
dasticity.  
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Table 33  Results of panel estimation of the impact on labour productivity by share experimental development (2003-
2015)  
 Bottom 50% experimental 
development
Top 50% experimental
 development 
Dependent variable: Labour productivity   
Explanatory variables (R&D expenditures):   
One-year lag labour productivity 0.42 (10.28) *** 0.08 (0.97) 
No public support -0.01 (-1.14) -0.01 (-1.37) 
Direct support only  0.12 (1.78) * 0.18 (2.43) *** 
Partial exemption only -0.02 (-1.73) * -0.06 (-2.15) ** 
CIT incentives only -0.08 (-2.11) ** -0.08 (-1.58)  
Direct support and partial exemption 0.13 (1.52) * 0.17 (1.70) * 
Direct support and CIT incentives 0.06 (1.16) 0.13 (2.11) ** 
Partial exemption and CIT incentives -0.08 (-2.38) ** -0.07 (-2.13) ** 
Direct, partial exemption and CIT 0.06 (0.99) 0.11 (1.64) * 
R-squared  0.63 0.44 
Number of observations 4,825 4,993 
Note:  The table shows the results of fixed effects panel regression, using labour productivity defined as value added per full-time equivalent 
employee as dependent variable and a one-year lag of R&D expenditures of firms by groups according to which type of public support 
that they receive, as explanatory variables. CIT: corporate income taxation (R&D tax credit and tax deduction for 80% of patent 
income). The second (third) column shows the results for the 50% of firms with the lowest (highest) share of R&D expenditures oriented 
towards experimental development. Estimations include year and industry dummies and four inverse Mills variables computed from 
the estimation of a selection model in which a lag of labour productivity is included. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate 
differs from zero at a statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to 
heteroskedasticity.  
The estimates suggest that experimental development has a more positive impact on productivity than 
basic and applied research although for the latter longer lags may be more appropriate.39 Knott (2017) 
argues that although radical innovation, which more likely results from basic research than from exper-
imental development, may benefit the whole economy, it tends to have a lower return to firms than 
incremental innovation. An alternative explanation may be that estimates of the average private return 
to firms fail to capture the potentially disproportionate positive outcome of a small number of successful 
basic and applied research activities.  
Table 34 shows the results of an estimation of the impact of R&D on net profitability, using the same 
explanatory variables as in table 30. However, instead of using one-year lags for the right-hand side 
variables, the support group variables are included contemporaneously and the spillover variables with 
a one-year lag. 
Specifications with alternative lags provide few statistically significant estimates or negative estimates.40 
In contrast with the results for labour productivity, R&D has a positive impact on profitability for firms 
that benefit from tax incentives through corporate income taxation if combined with subsidies or partial 
exemption whereas statistically significant positive spillovers are now found for firms that receive sub-
sidies, used without other forms of public support or combined with tax incentives.   
 
                                                          
39  Estimations with two-year and three-year lags do not provide evidence of higher returns for firms with a high share of basis 
or applied research. These estimations are not reported but available upon request.  
40    Results not reported but available upon request. 
WORKING PAPER 4-19 
63 
Table 34  Results of panel estimation of the impact on net profitability (2003-2015)  
 No spillover variables Spillover variables included 
Dependent variable: Net profitability   
Explanatory variables (R&D expenditures):   
Lag net profitability 0.19 (8.20) *** 0.11 (4.06) *** 
No public support 0.00 (1.12) 0.00 (0.62) 
Direct support only  0.01 (1.13) 0.02 (1.48) 
Partial exemption only 0.01 (1.42) 0.00 (1.34) 
CIT incentives only 0.01 (0.73) 0.00 (0.02) 
Direct support and partial exemption 0.01 (0.90) 0.01 (0.76) 
Direct support and CIT incentives 0.03 (2.62) *** 0.04 (2.97) *** 
Partial exemption and CIT incentives 0.02 (2.25) ** 0.02 (1.44) 
Direct, partial exemption and CIT 0.01 (0.97) 0.01 (0.68) 
Spillovers    
Intra-industry no support  -0.04 (-1.01) 
Intra-industry only subsidies  0.05 (2.93) *** 
Intra-industry only tax incentives  -0.03 (-1.32) 
Intra-industry subsidies and tax incentives  0.05 (1.81) * 
Inter-industry no support  -0.27 (-0.58) 
Inter-industry only subsidies  0.19 (1.44) 
Inter-industry only tax incentives  -0.09 (-0.92) 
Inter-industry subsidies and tax incentives  0.54 (1.73) * 
R-squared (overall) 0.11 0.08 
Number of observations 6,873 4,431 
Note: The table shows the results of fixed effects panel regression, using net profitability as dependent variable and R&D expenditures of 
firms by group according to which type of public support that they receive, as explanatory variables. CIT: corporate income taxation 
(R&D tax credit and tax deduction for 80% of patent income). Estimations include year and industry dummies and four inverse Mills 
variables computed from the estimation of a selection model in which a lag of net profitability is included. *, ** and *** denotes that 
the coefficient estimate differs from zero at a statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in 
brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
Patents provide an indication of the intermediate output of research activities. The use of patents in 
protecting industrial applicability of inventions that result from R&D activities is very industry-specific. 
They are very important for pharmaceuticals and chemicals but not for office equipment. The benefits 
of patents to foster innovation are much debated. Sampat (2018) provides a recent review of the empir-
ical evidence on patents and their role in innovation.   
Bornemann, Laplante and Osswald (2018) investigate the impact of the Belgian tax deduction for patent 
income. Comparing Belgian firms to German firms, which do not benefit from any tax incentive for 
patent income, they conclude that the Belgian patent box increases the number of patents granted by 
the European Patent Office to Belgian firms but has a negative impact on the average quality of patents. 
They also consider the impact on the effective tax rate due to the patent box. Belgian multinationals that 
do not have an opportunity to shift income abroad would have the highest tax rate savings, followed 
by domestic firms. Multinationals with the opportunity to shift income abroad do not experience a sig-
nificant reduction in their effective tax rate due to the Belgian patent box.41 Cantner and Kösters (2015) 
report a positive impact of R&D subsidies on patent application by East German high-tech start-ups. 
                                                          
41   The potential to shift income abroad is denoted by an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the statutory tax rate of a 
foreign subsidiary or parent is lower than the Belgian statutory tax rate, and zero otherwise (Bornemann, Laplante and 
Osswald 2018: p. 39). 
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Using the data on the number of patents granted in Belgium in the R&D Policy Mix database, table 35 
shows the results of an estimation of the impact of public support on the number of patents granted to 
firms by the Belgian Office for Intellectual Property. Graph 15 shows the number of granted Belgian 
patents and the number of firms with granted patents for the period 2007-2015.  
 
As the dependent variable is a count variable with many zero values, a zero-inflated Poisson regression 
is used (see Lambert 1992, Cameron and Trivedi 2010).42  The Vuong test compares a zero-inflated Pois-
son specification to a standard Poisson specification. Rejection of the null hypothesis favours a zero-
inflated Poisson specification.  
There are rather robust indications of a positive impact of R&D expenditures on the number of patents 
for firms that receive direct support or that benefit from one of the four partial exemption schemes.  
The estimation includes four inverse Mills variables from a first-step estimation of a selection model in 
which the lag of the number of patents granted is included as one of the explanatory variables. The 
results of a specification with respectively a one- year and a two-year lag for R&D expenditures are 
reported.  
Contrary to the finding by Bornemann, Laplante and Osswald (2018), R&D expenditures of firms that 
benefit from tax incentives based on corporate income taxation, such as the tax deduction of 80% of 
patent income, do not appear to have a statistically significant impact on the number of granted patents, 
except if combined with subsidies or partial exemption. The estimation only considers Belgian patents 
and not patents granted by the European Patent Office or the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice.  
                                                          
42  As can be seen on the last line of Table 35, there are relatively few non-zero observations as not many Belgian patents appear 
to be granted.  
Graph 15 Number of Belgian patents granted and number of firms with granted patents (2007-2015)  
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Table 35  Results of panel estimation of the impact on the number of Belgian patents (2003-2015) 
 One-year lag One-year lag Two-year lag Two-year lag 
Dependent variable: Number of patents     
Explanatory variables (R&D expenditures):  
No public support 0.09 (3.98) *** 0.09 (2.39) ** -0.01 (-0.24) 0.02 (0.56) 
Direct support only  0.20 (6.39) *** 0.33 (5.52) *** 0.05 (2.23) ** 0.03 (0.87) 
Partial exemption only 0.25 (4.52) *** 0.16 (1.39) 0.13 (4.88) *** 0.10 (2.39) ** 
CIT incentives only 0.03 (0.63)         0.02 (0.38) -0.05 (-0.70) -0.01 (-0.29) 
Direct support and partial exemption 0.22 (4.13) *** 0.21 (1.94) * 0.11 (4.10) *** 0.09 (2.15) ** 
Direct support and CIT incentives 0.04 (1.04) 0.10 (2.19) ** 0.00 (0.19) 0.06 (1.14) 
Partial exemption and CIT incentives 0.06 (0.89) -0.11 (-0.89) 0.10 (3.59) *** 0.10 (2.22) ** 
Direct, partial exemption and CIT 0.15 (2.66) *** 0.13 (1.16) 0.11 (3.89) *** 0.13 (2.73) *** 
Spillovers:   
Intra-industry no support  0.39 (2.69) ***  -0.15 (-0.63) 
Intra-industry only subsidies  0.05 (0.82)  0.07 (1.01) 
Intra-industry only tax incentives  -0.12 (-1.21)  0.24 (2.09) ** 
Intra-industry subsidies and tax incentives  0.09 (0.99)  -0.11 (-1.18) 
Inter-industry no support  7.61 (2.56) ***  0.15 (0.04) 
Inter-industry only subsidies  0.31 (1.09)  -0.21 (-0.93) 
Inter-industry only tax incentives  2.20 (1.32)  4.99 (2.97) *** 
Inter-industry subsidies and tax incentives  5.19 (2.02) **  2.31 (1.02) 
Vuong test zero-inflated Poisson 6.38 (0.00) *** 6.32 (0.00) *** 6.01 (0.00) *** 4.89 (0.00) *** 
Number of observations (non-zero) 11,362 (279) 7,172 (209) 6,851 (213) 4,181 (156) 
Note:  The table shows the results of a zero-inflated Poisson regression, using the number of patents granted to firms in Belgium as dependent 
variable and R&D expenditures of firms by group according to which type of public support that they receive, as explanatory variables. 
CIT: corporate income taxation (R&D tax credit and tax deduction for 80% of patent income). Estimations include year dummies and 
four inverse Mills variables computed from the estimation of a selection model in which a lag of the number of granted patents is 
included. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs from zero at a statistical significance level of respectively 10%, 5% 
and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity. The Vuong test compares a zero-inflated Poisson to a 
standard Poisson regression. Rejection of the null hypothesis favours zero-inflated Poisson. 
The different results may indicate that the tax deduction for patent income results in the shifting of 
international patents by multinationals and not necessarily in an increase of patents granted as a result 
of domestic R&D activities.       
Although the estimations reported in this chapter ought to be considered with caution, the results indi-
cating that R&D investment by firms that receive public support has a stronger impact on the output of 
firms and also results in more spillovers than R&D performed by firms that do not receive public sup-
port, suggests that subsidies and tax incentives not only increase the input but also positively affects the 
output of business R&D.   
Profit shifting may affect most output indicators such as profits, value added and productivity. For 
future evaluation it would be worthwhile to include information on the potential of profit shifting such 
as affiliation of a firm to a multinational group.   
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6. Conclusions 
The third evaluation of the tax incentives in support of business R&D in Belgium, presented in this 
paper, provides relatively robust indications that the four schemes of partial exemption from payment 
of the withholding tax on the wages of R&D employees succeed in raising additional R&D activities. As 
in the previous evaluation, this applies especially to the partial exemption for R&D employees with a 
master’s degree whereas for the three other schemes (research cooperation, Young Innovative Compa-
nies and R&D employees with a PhD or civil engineering degree), more robust evidence of additionality 
is found than in the previous evaluation.   
On the other hand, the lack of evidence on the efficiency of the tax credit for R&D investment and the 
tax deduction for 80% of gross qualifying patent income reported in the previous evaluation is con-
firmed. Equally in line with previous evaluations, the third evaluation finds that additionality of public 
support is reduced if firms combine different support schemes, especially if firms combine direct sup-
port (subsidies) with several tax incentives.     
The rate of partial exemption from payment of the withholding tax is the same for PhDs or civil engi-
neers and masters. As PhDs and civil engineers, by definition, have a master’s degree, the usefulness of 
the distinction between the two partial exemption schemes based on the educational degree of R&D 
employees is not clear. The partial exemption from payment of the withholding tax on the wages of 
R&D employees with a bachelor’s degree in qualifying study fields was introduced too recently (Janu-
ary 2018) to be included in this evaluation as is the tax deduction for innovation income which replaced 
the tax deduction for patent income in 2016.    
The efficiency of public support seems to decrease with firm size and with the level of public support. 
For the R&D tax credit the coefficient is positive for firms with not more than 50 employees whereas the 
coefficient is negative for firms with more than 250 employees. There are also indications that the addi-
tionality of support decreases with the degree of market concentration of industries, especially for the 
R&D tax credit, the tax deduction for 80% of patent income and the partial exemption from payment of 
the withholding tax for Young Innovative Companies. These findings indicate that some differentiation 
in public support across industries - for example, according to the level of market competition – may be 
considered although it may be challenging to ensure that this complies with EU rules on state aid. It 
certainly indicates that further investigation of the link between R&D investment and market competi-
tion is warranted, from a static as well as from a dynamic perspective.  
Three of the four partial exemption schemes appear to result in a relative shift in R&D investment to-
wards experimental development at the expense of basic and applied research which lends support to 
concerns that especially large firms increasingly shy away from basic and applied research which are 
probably more vital to long-term technological progress and economic growth than experimental de-
velopment.  
Estimation of the impact of public support on the output of firms suggests relatively strong positive 
effects of R&D activities of firms that receive direct support (regional subsidies). The large negative 
coefficients found for firms that receive tax benefits though corporate income taxation are difficult to 
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explain and may hint at a bias in output indicators due to profit shifting, as reported in some studies. 
Future evaluation may consider information on the profit shifting potential of firms, such as the affilia-
tion of a firm to a multinational group.          
Although the impact of the recent reform of Belgian corporate income taxation (for example, reduction 
in the tax rate) remains uncertain, the strong increase in the budgetary cost of the R&D tax incentives in 
Belgium calls for reflection on possible ways to slow down the rise in government support through tax 
incentives as a percentage of GDP. The two tax incentives for which few indications of efficiency can be 
found account for the bulk of the budgetary cost of tax incentives in support of business R&D. The tax 
deduction for patent income was replaced in 2016 by a tax deduction for innovation income, in accord-
ance with the OECD Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS) guidelines. The R&D tax credit therefore seems 
the most obvious support scheme for adjustment, in a way that constrains the increase in the budgetary 
cost without hindering the potential of tax incentives to raise additional R&D activities. Recent reforms 
of the French R&D tax credit, which appear to have contained the rise in the budgetary cost as a per-
centage of GDP, offer an interesting benchmark.   
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Annexes 
Annex 1: List of NACE REV.2 industries 
 
1 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities
2 Forestry and logging 
3 Fishing and aquaculture 
5 Mining of coal and lignite 
6 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 
7 Mining of metal ores 
8 Other mining and quarrying 
9 Mining support service activities
10 Manufacture of food products 
11 Manufacture of beverages 
12 Manufacture of tobacco products 
13 Manufacture of textiles 
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel 
15 Manufacture of leather and related products 
16 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of 
articles of straw and plaiting materials 
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
24 Manufacture of basic metals 
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 
31 Manufacture of furniture 
32 Other manufacturing 
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
36 Water collection, treatment and supply
37 Sewerage 
38 Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery 
39 Remediation activities and other waste management services 
41 Construction of buildings 
42 Civil engineering 
43 Specialised construction activities 
45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
49 Land transport and transport via pipelines 
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50 Water transport 
51 Air transport 
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation 
53 Postal and courier activities 
55 Accommodation 
56 Food and beverage service activities 
58 Publishing activities 
59 
Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and music 
publishing activities 
60 Programming and broadcasting activities 
61 Telecommunications 
62 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 
63 Information service activities 
64 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding 
65 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security 
66 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities 
68 Real estate activities 
69 Legal and accounting activities 
70 Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities 
71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis 
72 Scientific research and development  
73 Advertising and market research
74 Other professional, scientific and technical activities 
75 Veterinary activities 
77 Rental and leasing activities 
78 Employment activities 
79 Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation service and related activities 
80 Security and investigation activities 
81 Services to buildings and landscape activities
82 Office administrative, office support and other business support activities 
84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
85 Education 
86 Human health activities 
87 Residential care activities 
88 Social work activities without accommodation 
90 Creative, arts and entertainment activities
91 Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities 
92 Gambling and betting activities 
93 Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities 
94 Activities of membership organisations 
95 Repair of computers and personal and household goods 
96 Other personal service activities 
97 Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel
98 
Undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of private households for own 
use 
99 Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 
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Annex 2: Comparison of joint estimation of all support schemes with separate 
estimation 
Table A.1  Results of fixed effects panel estimation (2003-2015) – Joint versus separate estimation  
 Joint Separate 
Dependent variable (R&D expenditures net of public support)
Explanatory variables (public support): 
Regional subsidy 0.09 (7.90) *** 0.10 (8.83) *** 
Research cooperation 0.12 (4.58) *** 0.14 (5.69) *** 
Young Innovative Company 0.12 (3.25) *** 0.10 (2.57) ** 
PhDs and civil engineers 0.08 (4.76) *** 0.14 (7.99) *** 
Master 0.14 (8.67) *** 0.17 (10.15) *** 
Tax credit R&D 0.01 (0.24) 0.06 (2.33) ** 
Tax deduction 80% patent income -0.02 (-1.14)  0.03 (1.45) 
Note:  The table compares the results of Log1 as reported in the second column of table 10 in which the impact of all support schemes is 
estimated jointly to a fixed effects panel estimation in which each support scheme is considered separately, in effect, without con-
trolling for the public support that firms receive through other schemes. All estimations include industry and year dummies. All 
variables are considered in logs. *, ** and *** denotes that the coefficient estimate differs from zero at a statistical significance level 
of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. The t-values, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
The results show that ignoring support received through other schemes results in overestimation of the 
efficiency and statistical significance of individual schemes, except for the partial exemption for Young 
Innovative Companies. This is especially true for the R&D tax credit for which separate estimation pro-
vides a statistically significant positive coefficient which is not the case if support through other schemes 
is controlled for. For the tax deduction of 80% of patent income, separate estimation results in a positive , 
though not statistically significant, coefficient whereas in the joint estimation the coefficient is negative 
(also not statistically significant).  
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Annex 3: Revised Pavitt taxonomy for manufacturing and services (Bogliacino 
and Pianta 2015) 
 
 Nace REV.2 Pavitt
SCIENCE BASED  
  
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  20 1 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical prep. 21 1 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products  26 1 
Telecommunications 61 1 
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities  62 1 
Scientific research and development  72 1 
 
SPECIALISED SUPPLIERS  
  
Manufacture of electrical equipment  27 2 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  28 2 
Manufacture of other transport equipment  30 2 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment  33 2 
Real estate activities 68 2 
Legal and accounting activities  69 2 
Management consultancy activities  70 2 
Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis 71 2 
Advertising and market research  73 2 
Other professional, scientific and technical activities  74 2 
Rental and leasing activities  77 2 
Office administrative, office support and other business support activities 82 2 
 
SCALE AND INFORMATION INTENSIVE  
  
Manufacture of paper and paper products  17 3 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media  18 3 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  19 3 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  22 3 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  23 3 
Manufacture of basic metals  24 3 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  29 3 
Publishing activities 58 3 
Audiovisual activities 59 3 
Broadcasting activities 60 3 
Information service activities  63 3 
Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding  64 3 
Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security 65 3 
Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities  66 3 
 
WORKING PAPER 4-19 
77 
 Nace REV.2 Pavitt
SUPPLIERS DOMINATED  
  
Manufacture of food products  10 4 
Manufacture of beverages  11 4 
Manufacture of tobacco products  12 4 
Manufacture of textiles 13 4 
Manufacture of wearing apparel  14 4 
Manufacture of leather and related products  15 4 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture 16 4 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 25 4 
Manufacture of furniture  31 4 
Other manufacturing 32 4 
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 45 4 
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles  46 4 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles  47 4 
Land transport and transport via pipelines  49 4 
Water transport 50 4 
Air transport 51 4 
Warehousing and support activities for transportation  52 4 
Postal and courier activities  53 4 
Accommodation and food service activities  55 4 
Accommodation and food service activities  56 4 
Veterinary activities 75 4 
Employment activities 78 4 
Travel agency, tour operator reservation service and related activities 79 4 
Security and investigation activities  80 4 
Services to buildings and landscape activities  81 4 
 
 
